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Orcalli, Gabriele

doi:10.1023/a:1023695606353

Constitutional Political Economy

2003

DOI: 10.1023/a:1023695606353

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Gabriele Orcalli

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Cited by 3 publications

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Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade

Herrmann‐Pillath

2006

Constit Polit Econ

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In common descriptions of the world trading system, MFN and national treatment embody the principle of non-discrimination. Reciprocity is mostly regarded as a remnant of mercantilist trade policy. This paper argues that reciprocity is the more fundamental constitutional rule, because it reflects the unanimity principle enabling countries to identify Pareto-improving changes of trade policy. I reconstruct the implicit constitution of world trade by applying some methodology of positive constitutional economics. A major result is that in the Uruguay round a fundamental constitutional change took place from general reciprocity to “status quo reciprocity”, which entails the possibility of Pareto-deteriorating institutional changes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006Positive constitutional economics, WTO/GATT, Reciprocity, Regionalism, MFN, F02, F13,

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Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade

Herrmann‐Pillath

2006

Constit Polit Econ

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Clubbing in trade policies: How much a threat to the multilateral constitution?

Dluhosch,

Horgos

2023

Const Polit Econ

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Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have mushroomed over the last decades. However, the various forms of bi- and plurilateral arrangements have always been met with the concern that their proliferation might come at the expense of overall trade freedom because of undermining multilateral governance. This paper starts from the fact that international treaties are notoriously difficult to enforce, as is compliance with (trade) agreements. By focusing on the political economy of how cooperation in trade liberalization is ultimately sustained via the threat of retaliation as institutionalized within the World Trade Organization (WTO), the paper illuminates a novel and completely different channel between PTA membership and multilateral trade liberalization. Exploring their interaction with respect to trade freedom, we explain that PTA membership actually improves on the working of multilateral arrangements that are supposed to ensure cooperation in trade liberalization, thus effectively catering to more open trade.

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Scrutinizing States’ Power in a Liberalized Economy: A Comparative Analysis of the International Investment Regime and the International Trade System

Perrone

2010

SSRN Journal

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Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade

Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade

Clubbing in trade policies: How much a threat to the multilateral constitution?

Scrutinizing States’ Power in a Liberalized Economy: A Comparative Analysis of the International Investment Regime and the International Trade System

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