You're in the Army Now: The Politics of Cohesion During Military Integration in Sierra Leone

Abstract

Social Sciences at the University of Bath. His research explores the changing face of conflict and the construction of martial force.Acknowledgements: This research was funded through scholarships from the University of Exeter and Babcock International Ltd. The author is grateful to all those who have contributed to this project, and in particular, to the two anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful observations, as well as all those who provided comments on a previous draft of this paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention 2017.Military integration is intended to facilitate post-conflict stabilization, by creating unified armed forces from formerly antagonistic armed groups. However, integrated armies often struggle to overcome the factional identities of their soldiers, raising questions about interventionists' ability to produce military cohesion during such processes. Yet, in the established scholarship on military cohesion, largely derived from study of Western armed forces, internal small-group social dynamics are privileged over and above broader societal and political identities. This article examines the post-conflict military integration programme conducted in Sierra Leone, in order to test extant theories of military "social cohesion". Contrary to theoretical expectations, military cohesion in Sierra Leone proved highly relianton wider (and highly politicized) societal identities, undermining integration efforts. This finding not only challenges existing understandings of social cohesion and its determinants, but also the utility of military integration as vehicle for post-conflict stabilization and civilmilitary change.2 Military service is an activity deeply infused with social and political meaning. However, this relationship between military service and social identity can have significant implications for post-conflict stabilization, highlighting the role of internal military cohesion during such transitions. In Western armed forces, military cohesion is viewed as the essence of collective resilience, and is considered essential for organizational effectiveness. 1 Yet, in 2014, the UStutored Iraqi Army prominently collapsed in the face of Islamic State militants, with observers citing internal sectarian divisions as a central explanation for battlefield failure. 2 Evidently, the production of military cohesion cannot be taken for granted in such fragile political environments. At the same time, though, prominent approaches to peacebuilding and post-conflict stabilization like military integration rely on the ability to produce military cohesion in socially and politically diverse armed forces. In so doing, they envision a particular relationship between social identity, military service and institutional effectiveness.Advocates of military integration view the process as necessary for political stabilization, as well as a potential exemplar for new forms of communal interaction. 3 However, the apparent difficulty in assuaging antagonistic social and politic...

Military integration and intelligence capacity: informational effects of incorporating former rebels

“…Comparative case studies have explored military integration's role in peace agreement implementation and peace duration, offering mixed evidence on when integration improves the chances of conflict resolution and sustaining peace (Burgess 2008;Gaub 2011;Krebs and Licklider 2015;Møller and Cawthra 2007;Wilén 2016). Single-case studies have detailed the development and implementation of military integration policies and their relative effectiveness in building peace and constructing more capable militaries (Baaz and Verweijen 2013;Licklider 2014b;Neads 2020;Samii 2013;Santos 2010b;Warner 2013).…”

“…Separate units can make monitoring more difficult for commanders and increase the potential for defection, though they may be preferred by commanders when trust in integrees is low (Krebs and Licklider 2015, 100;Simonsen 2007, 579). The ability to benefit from integrees' knowledge and networks in either organizational structure will likely also depend on integrees' degree of socialization into state forces (see Jowell 2014;Neads 2020), and on unit and force commanders' respect for ex-rebels (see Hall 2012;Samii 2014).…”