Young children rely on gossip when jointly reasoning about whom to believe.

Abstract

People rely on reputational information communicated via gossip when deciding about with whom to cooperate, whom to believe, and whom to trust. In two studies, we investigated whether 5-and 7-yearold children trust in gossip when determining a course of action. In Study 1, 5-and 7-year-old Germanspeaking peer dyads (N = 64 dyads, 32 female dyads) were presented with a collaborative problem-solving task (e.g., deciding together what a creature eats). Each child individually received conflicting information about the solution from a different informant (e.g., one proposed rocks; the other proposed sand). Each child additionally heard gossip about the informant's reputation: one informant had a good reputation; the other had a bad reputation. In the experimental condition, the reputation was relevant to the task (honesty), whereas it was irrelevant in the control condition (tidiness). Seven-year-old dyads, and 5-year-old dyads to a lesser extent, settled on the items suggested by the informant with good reputation in the experimental but not in the control condition. Only 7-year-old children explicitly referred to the information conveyed via gossip, engaging in metatalk about the reputations of the informants. In Study 2, we replicated these findings in a more controlled experiment in which 5-and 7-year-old American English-speaking children (N = 48, 27 girls) tried to convince an adult partner who proposed the item suggested by the informant with bad reputation. Thus, starting around age 5, and more reliably at age 7, children selectively rely on gossip in identifying trustworthy individuals in their collaborative reasoning with partners.

Does first‐hand evidence undermine young children's initial trust in positive gossip? Evidence from 5‐ to 6‐year‐old children

“…For example, individuals who praise others might be considered good at identifying other people's virtues (Shinohara & Kobayashi, 2022). Children are more likely to trust people with a good reputation (Köymen & Engelmann, 2022). By implication, children are more likely to believe positive gossip and a positive gossiper, because a positive gossiper has a good reputation.…”

“…In some cases, adults tend to believe gossip even when it conflicts with first-hand information (Sommerfeld et al, 2007). Children also often form impressions of others, not just on the basis of direct observation but also on the basis of gossip (Köymen & Engelmann, 2022). But gossip is not always accurate, and sometimes it is even wrong (Kuttler et al, 2002).…”

“…In small groups, individuals can draw inferences about the reliability of others from direct observation. But in larger groups, where individuals are often unable to interact with others directly, gossip can be a useful source of information (Haux et al, 2017; Köymen & Engelmann, 2022). In some cases, adults tend to believe gossip even when it conflicts with first‐hand information (Sommerfeld et al, 2007).…”

“…Engelmann et al (2016) found that from the age of 5, children spontaneously produce prosocial gossip that affects the reputation of an absent third party. In addition, Köymen and Engelmann (2022) found that 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children were prone to endorse positive rather than negative gossip. Gossip not only affects the reputation of the target of gossip but also affects children's evaluations of the purveyor of gossip (Ingram, 2019; Köymen & Engelmann, 2022).…”

Children's developing ability to adjust their beliefs reasonably in light of disagreement

“…Finally, research with even older children suggests that, by age 7—sometimes referred to as the “age of reason” (see Tomasello, 2020)—children reliably compare the strength of the evidence supporting their own claim versus the claim of a disagreeing other, even in more complex contexts. For example, 7‐year‐olds selectively maintain their initial belief or adopt another person's belief, depending on which belief is supported by first‐ versus second‐hand evidence (Köymen & Engelmann, 2022; Köymen & Tomasello, 2018; see also Morgan et al, 2015).…”