2014
DOI: 10.1037/a0038186
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Young children’s causal explanations are biased by post-action associative information.

Abstract: In a series of 4 experiments, we tested children's understanding that the causes of their actions must necessarily be attributed to information known prior to (i.e., "pre-action" information), rather than after (i.e., "post-action" information), the completion of their actions. For example, children were shown a dog, asked to get some cheese to feed the dog, and then returned to discover a mouse. In Experiment 1, the majority of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds claimed that they had gotten the cheese to feed the mouse.… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…However, in Experiment 3, almost all children (including those that went on to choose the wrong token) answered the memory question correctly. This result is consistent with other findings that suggest episodic memory at age 4 is fragile and can be disrupted by intervening semantic or associative information if it is in conflict with the past reality [24,25]. Our suggestion is therefore that children could in principle have remembered the identity of the box in Experiment 1 before they chose the token; however, whether they actually remembered correctly and then nevertheless chose at chance (which, in turn, corrupted their answer to the memory question), or they simply failed to try to remember the identity of the box at all, is a question for future work.…”
Section: Methodssupporting
confidence: 93%
“…However, in Experiment 3, almost all children (including those that went on to choose the wrong token) answered the memory question correctly. This result is consistent with other findings that suggest episodic memory at age 4 is fragile and can be disrupted by intervening semantic or associative information if it is in conflict with the past reality [24,25]. Our suggestion is therefore that children could in principle have remembered the identity of the box in Experiment 1 before they chose the token; however, whether they actually remembered correctly and then nevertheless chose at chance (which, in turn, corrupted their answer to the memory question), or they simply failed to try to remember the identity of the box at all, is a question for future work.…”
Section: Methodssupporting
confidence: 93%