Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social Norm

Schmidt, Marco F. H.; Butler, Lucas P.; Heinz, Julia; Tomasello, Michael

doi:10.1177/0956797616661182

Cited by 177 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…labeling, "this is daxing") or teaching behaviors (e.g. addressing the children) to indicate the presence of a rule (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016).…”

Section: Can Change Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Young children consider individual authority and collective agreement when deciding who can change rules

Zhao

Kushnir

2018

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

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Young children demonstrate awareness of normativity in various domains of social learning. It is unclear, however, whether children recognize that rules can be changed in certain contexts and by certain people or groups. Across three studies, we provided empirical evidence that children consider individual authority and collective agreement when reasoning about who can change rules. In Study 1, children of 4 to 7 years old watched videos of children playing simply sorting and stacking games in groups or alone. Across conditions the group game was initiated 1) by one child, 2) by collaborative agreement, or 3) by an adult authority. In the group games with a rule initiated by one child, children attributed ability to change rules only to that individual and not his/her friends, and mentioned ownership and authority in their explanations.When the rule was initiated collaboratively, older children said that no individual could change the rule, while young children said that either individual could do so. When an adult initiated the rule children stated that only the adult could change it. In contrast, children always endorsed a child's decision to change his own solitary play, and never endorsed any child's ability to change moral and conventional rules in daily life. Age differences corresponded to beliefs about friendship and agreement in peer play (Study 2) and disappeared when the decision process behind and normative force of collaboratively initiated rules was clarified (Study 3). These results show important connections between normativity and considerations of authority and collaboration in early childhood.

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“…labeling, "this is daxing") or teaching behaviors (e.g. addressing the children) to indicate the presence of a rule (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016).…”

Section: Can Change Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Young children consider individual authority and collective agreement when deciding who can change rules

Zhao

Kushnir

2018

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

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“…These cognitive abilities are supported by a psychological system that has evolved to understand the minds of others and to navigate complex social group behavior (49)(50)(51). Well-documented cognitive biases reinforce cultural transmission, including preferences for similar others (homophily) (52) and proclivities for conformity (53), consensus (54)(55)(56), prestige (57,58), and social norms (59)(60)(61)(62).…”

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confidence: 99%

Cumulative cultural learning: Development and diversity

Legare

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

138

101

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The complexity and variability of human culture is unmatched by any other species. Humans live in culturally constructed niches filled with artifacts, skills, beliefs, and practices that have been inherited, accumulated, and modified over generations. A causal account of the complexity of human culture must explain its distinguishing characteristics: It is cumulative and highly variable within and across populations. I propose that the psychological adaptations supporting cumulative cultural transmission are universal but are sufficiently flexible to support the acquisition of highly variable behavioral repertoires. This paper describes variation in the transmission practices (teaching) and acquisition strategies (imitation) that support cumulative cultural learning in childhood. Examining flexibility and variation in caregiver socialization and children's learning extends our understanding of evolution in living systems by providing insight into the psychological foundations of cumulative cultural transmissionthe cornerstone of human cultural diversity.cumulative culture | cultural evolution | cross-cultural comparison | teaching | imitation

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“…Moreover, they argue that young children are biased to expect information that is intentionally communicated to them to be relevant, important, and generalizable. Indeed, a number of empirical studies have shown that even infants process information differently and form difference expectations when evidence is deliberately manifested for them (Futó et al, 2010;Egyed, Király, & Gergely, 2013;Yoon, Johnson, & Csibra, 2008;) and by early childhood they treat that information as more important and generalizable in a variety of ways (Bonawitz et al, 2011;Butler & Markman, 2012, 2016Butler et al, 2015;Schmidt et al, 2016;Vredenburgh et al, 2015).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Seeing novel properties or actions demonstrated intentionally, with cues suggesting the pedagogical intent to transmit important infomation, leads children to make inductive generalizations about that evidence that are stronger and more resistant to counter-evidence (Butler & Markman, 2012b, 2016 Hernik & Cisbra, 2015), leads them to construct radically different conceptions of novel categories (Butler & Markman, 2014;Futó, Téglás, Csibra, & Gergely, 2010;Kovács, Téglás, Gergely, & Csibra, 2016;Yoon, Johnson, & Csibra, 2008), and leads them to infer that Pedagogy and counterevidence 6 the demonstrated action is the only (Bonawitz, Shafto et al, 2011) or normatively correct (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016; Vrendenburgh, Kushnir, & Casasola, 2014) way to act. Taken together, this evidence suggests that children's sensitivity to whether or not actions are carried out with pedagogical intent towards the child shapes the inferences children make about the evidence those actions produce.…”

Section: Children's Use Of Social Cues To Guide Inductive Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Look again: Pedagogical demonstration facilitates children's use of counterevidence

Butler¹

2018

Preprint

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In learning about the world, we must not only make inferences based on minimal evidence, but must deal with conflicting evidence and question those initial inferences when they appear to be wrong. In three experiments (N=96), we found that in some cases young children only revise their causal beliefs when conflicting evidence is explicitly demonstrated for them.Four-and 5-year-old children inferred a rule about what objects had causal powers, and then saw evidence conflicting with that initial inference. Critically, the conflicting evidence was produced either instrumentally and intentionally, or demonstrated communicatively and pedagogically.Only when evidence was explicitly demonstrated for them did children revise their initial hypothesis and use a subtle clue to infer the correct rule.Keywords: belief revision; categorization; pedagogy; social cognition; conceptual development Pedagogy and counterevidence 3 Look again: Pedagogical demonstration facilitates children's use of counterevidenceAs humans, we live in a world of unfathomable uncertainty, yet assume that within that noise there are signals that will help us derive meaning and order. We search for meaningful patterns that help explain the structure of the world (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014), and we both strive to and succeed in identifying those patterns and using them to organize our knowledge, actions, judgments, and decisions across a wide variety of contexts (Gelman, 2003;Gelman & Wellman, 1991;Keil, 1989;Markman, 1989). And yet, as should be expected when drawing uncertain inferences from minimal data, much of the time the initial inferences that we make are wrong. We infer that the earth is flat, that the sun orbits the earth, that invisible entities determine everyday events, that moving objects have a hidden force inside them.Given that the evidence available to us is insufficient to ensure accuracy, and frequently leads to incorrect conclusions and common misconceptions, the capacity to revise our initial inferences based on of new and conflicting evidence is critical to constructing a coherent understanding of the world. And though this is undoubtedly true throughout the lifespan, it is especially true for children forming the initial causal theories that will frame their subsequent learning. Even very young children are sensitive to surprising or unexpected evidence, at least when it presents a clear conflict (Legare, 2012;Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). But relevant counterevidence may often be subtle and easily overlooked unless there is reason to think it might be particularly important. In making inferences, children use others as a source of knowledge to help guide inductive inferences in the face of uncertainty and to gauge the importance of new information. The current research aims to bring this work to bear on the critical process of hypothesis revision in the face of counterevidence. We asked whether children Pedagogy and counterevidence 4 might be more likely to make use of counterevidence in revising their initial hypotheses, when...

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Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social Norm

Cited by 177 publications

References 40 publications

Young children consider individual authority and collective agreement when deciding who can change rules

Young children consider individual authority and collective agreement when deciding who can change rules

Cumulative cultural learning: Development and diversity

Look again: Pedagogical demonstration facilitates children's use of counterevidence

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