Youth Political Mobilization: Violence, Intimidation, and Patronage in Zimbabwe

Abstract

In this article, we argue that the "making" and deployment of political violence can be construed as hard work, in which political elites mobilize those from below to sustain their positions through the mobilization and doing of violence against perceived opposition political parties and or individuals. The article examines the ways in which former President Robert Mugabe instrumentalized his political relationship with his clients as a tool of political mobilization and perpetrating political violence in urban spaces where his electoral support base had dwindled. We argue that one of the remarkable ways in which Mugabe was able to remain in power for three decades was through his ability to creatively transform his influence and political position into a source of opportunities for his political clients, in particular the youth. We, therefore, assert that Mugabe extended and maintained his political patrimonial relationship with youths who did the work of political violence for him and his ZANU-PF party. The mobilization of youth political violence is therefore an "art of governing" from below. This article is based on ethnographic data collected between 2016 and 2017 from youth in Harare. We conducted in-depth interviews, life-history interviews, observations, and informal conversations with youth in Harare city, Zimbabwe.

Power and vulnerability: Re-reading Mark 6:14–29 in the light of political violence in Zimbabwe

“…The issue of recruiting poor youth and then promise them rewards and opportunities to rise up the economic ladder was also observed by Maringira and Gukurume (2020) whose work focused on how Mugabe and ZANU-PF ensured that they remained in power by mobilising political violence in return for political benefits. They argued that as appeasement for engaging in acts of political violence, Mugabe and his party allocated residential stands to these youth, although some of these stands proved to be of dubious nature, as they would eventually be considered as illegal by the local authorities (Maringira & Gukurume 2020). Furthermore, ZANU-PF also patronised youth by subjecting them to fear, such that some would only participate in order to avoid being labelled as traitors of 'the revolution' (Maringira & Gukurume 2020;Mwonzora & Helliker 2000).…”

“…They argued that as appeasement for engaging in acts of political violence, Mugabe and his party allocated residential stands to these youth, although some of these stands proved to be of dubious nature, as they would eventually be considered as illegal by the local authorities (Maringira & Gukurume 2020). Furthermore, ZANU-PF also patronised youth by subjecting them to fear, such that some would only participate in order to avoid being labelled as traitors of 'the revolution' (Maringira & Gukurume 2020;Mwonzora & Helliker 2000). Some ZANU-PF youth who committed crimes during the elections became victims of political violence after elections as some were allegedly assaulted and others killed by youth members of the MDC party who claimed vengeance against the atrocities they had suffered (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2008).…”

“…While the article only focuses on the violence perpetrated by youth, it acknowledges the fact that there are also other stakeholders such as the army. The problem of political violence in Zimbabwe and the extent to which it negatively impacts the human rights of Zimbabwean citizens is well-documented (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe 2009; Maringira & Gukurume 2020;Mavengano & Moyo 2023;Mhike 2018;Muchacha 2016;Mwonzora & Helliker 2020;Research and Advocacy Unit 2018;Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008) among others. Zimbabwe is ranked as the most politically violent country in Southern Africa when it comes to harmonised elections (Research and Advocacy Unit 2018).…”

Pentecostalism and the (de)construction of ‘Otherness’: Experiences of black African students at a South African University

“…As Cornell and Kessi (2017) argued, while apartheid was dismantled in 1994 and South African universities have undergone a series of structural transformations, many of them remain racialised spaces. In fact, many South Africans portray universities such as UCT as ‘white universities’, while SU, the University of Pretoria, and the UFS are viewed as ‘Afrikaner Universities.’ During the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall protests from 2016 to 2019, many students raised concerns about the lack of meaningful transformation and demanded free and decolonised education at these universities (Gukurume & Maringira, 2022; Maringira and Gukurume, 2016, 2020). Likewise, stories of socio‐cultural exclusion and marginality are commonplace within these universities.…”

“…I assert that the Church can be imagined as a space of xenophilia where positive and convivial relationships between the migrant and the citizen are forged (Tewolde, 2021). In the same vein, scholars such as Meyer (2004) have underscored how Pentecostal religiosity can be understood as a manifestation of symbolic resistance of marginalised people’ (see also Gukurume, 2017; Maringira & Gukurume, 2022; Pieterse, 2016). It should be underscored that the real and perceived role of the Church as a ‘spiritual’ family for foreign students is similar to the role of the Pentecostal churches among other non‐student immigrant populations who are members of the same Church.…”