2023
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-38460-8
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Zero-determinant strategy in stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game

Abstract: In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the attacker may be a boundedly rational player, who adopts a combination of the BR strategy and a fixed stubborn one. In such a condition, the SSE strategy may not maintain the defensive performance due to the stubbornness. In this paper, we focus on how the defender can adopt t… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…In recent years, some scholars have expanded the theoretical research in symmetric games to asymmetric games. For example, stochastic evolutionary dynamics of asymmetric games in finite populations [15][16][17][18][19][20] and zero-determinant strategies in asymmetric games [21,22].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent years, some scholars have expanded the theoretical research in symmetric games to asymmetric games. For example, stochastic evolutionary dynamics of asymmetric games in finite populations [15][16][17][18][19][20] and zero-determinant strategies in asymmetric games [21,22].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%