Zero-error attacks on a quantum key distribution FSO system

Kupferman, Judy; Arnon, Shlomi

doi:10.1364/osac.1.001079

Cited by 12 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…• If the legitimate receiver only wants to improve its received power (without taking the eavesdropper into account) in the σ 2 V = σ 2 H case, the optimal G D can be found by (10), which depends on the parameter setting, i.e., may not just make G D as large as possible (shown in Fig. 1).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The pointing error angle (θ) at D can be divided into two parts, i.e., θ = θ 2 V + θ 2 H , where θ H and θ V are the azimuth and elevation pointing error angles, respectively. Like in [10], we assume that θ H and θ V are Gaussian random variables (RVs). However, we consider the general case in which these RVs are not necessarily with zero mean and the same variance.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Digital Object Identifier direction caused by atmospheric turbulence or building sway should be taken into account [5], [6], [7]. An inevitable drawback in the QKD FSO systems is backflash in the legitimate receiver side, when the legitimate receiver adopts a common detection method, relying on a single photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD) [8], [9], [10]. Indeed, with the SPAD detection scheme, an avalanche happens, resulting in the emission of a secondary photon, i.e., backflash, which can be captured by eavesdroppers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, with the SPAD detection scheme, an avalanche happens, resulting in the emission of a secondary photon, i.e., backflash, which can be captured by eavesdroppers. Kupferman and Arnon in [10] have recently presented an analytical framework to evaluate the impact of backflash on the performance of QKD FSO systems. However, in their investigation, the adopted model for the azimuth and elevation pointing error angles assumed zero mean and equal variance for both angles, and the pointing error angle at eavesdroppers was set to zero.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, for real life deployment, QKD FSO systems may have to operate under different and more general conditions. Further, the authors in [10] did not investigate the optimal point of the telescope gain to maximize the received power at the legitimate receiver.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

On the Performance of Quantum Key Distribution FSO Systems Under a Generalized Pointing Error Model

Zhao

Alouini

2019

IEEE Commun. Lett.

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In this letter, the performance of a quantum key distribution (QKD) free-space optical (FSO) system is analyzed while taking a generalized pointing error model into account. More specifically, closed-form expressions for the average received powers at both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are derived. In addition, their corresponding asymptotic results valid in the high telescope gain regime are also presented. To capture the secure performance, we also investigate the ratio of received powers at the eavesdropper and at the legitimate receiver. Further, in some special cases, we find the optimal telescope gains for the received powers at both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, as well as the power ratio, which is important and useful for a secure QKD FSO system design. Finally, some selected numerical results are presented to illustrate the mathematical formalism and validate the accuracy of the derived analytical expressions.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the Performance of Quantum Key Distribution FSO Systems Under a Generalized Pointing Error Model

Zhao

Alouini

2019

IEEE Commun. Lett.

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Backflash Light as a Security Vulnerability in Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Vybornyi

Trichili

Alouini

2021

Physical Layer Security

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Based on the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics, two communicating parties can generate and share a secret random key that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages sent over an insecure channel. This process is known as quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to classical encryption schemes, the security of a QKD system does not depend on the computational complexity of specific mathematical problems. However, QKD systems can be subject to different kinds of attacks, exploiting engineering and technical imperfections of the components forming the systems. Here, we review the security vulnerabilities of QKD. We mainly focus on a particular effect known as backflash light, which can be a source of eavesdropping attacks. We equally highlight the methods for quantifying backflash emission and the different ways to mitigate this effect.

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