シビアアクシデント対策整備の経緯と「残余のリスク」

Structural Ignorance of Expertise in Nuclear Safety Controversies: Case Analysis of Post-Fukushima Japan

“…Except for seismic PRAs in accordance with the revision of the regulatory guide for seismic design in September 2006, the resources for expanding the assessment scope into other external events and level 2 and 3 PRAs had not been effectively allocated. 61 While some attribute the delay in expanding the breadth of assessment to the exclusion of PRA from the regulatory scope when the PSR was made mandatory in 2002, the authors see it as a form of what Rayner called "uncomfortable knowledge," or potential information that presents a sort of danger to institutions. 62 As many academic studies and media coverage critically pointed out, Japanese nuclear power plants had been insisted as being "absolutely safe" before 2011 by almost all the nuclear proponents in this country.…”