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Farmer-led seed enterprises can produce good quality seed and market it. However, for them to thrive, they need a conducive policy and regulatory framework that is inclusive and less stringent than existing regulatory frameworks. One way to provide a more enabling environment for farmer-led enterprises is through the Quality Declared Seed (QDS) production and marketing system. In Uganda, this seed class is specifically introduced for farmer-led enterprises to produce and market quality assured seed of crops and varieties not served by the private sector. The class is anchored in the Ugandan National Seed Policy and its seed regulations and its operationalization plan. We identified a combination of three strategies that enabled the QDS class to be incorporated into the National Seed Policy. These were: (i) to generate evidence to demonstrate that local seed businesses (farmer groups) can produce and market quality seed; (ii) to engage stakeholders towards an inclusive seed policy; and (iii) to develop a separate QDS regulatory framework. By 2021, institutionalization has reached a critical mass. Areas of attention for full institutionalization are the decentralization of inspection services, awareness and demand creation for quality seed, increasing the number of seed producers, and solving shortages of basic seed (starting material for producing seed).

We examine smallholder farmers’ willingness to pay for agricultural technology and whether information is a constraint to adoption of certified maize seed in Northern Uganda. The uptake of improved maize varieties by smallholder farmers in Uganda remains persistently low, despite the higher yield potential compared to traditional varieties. A recently growing body of literature identifies information constraints as a potential barrier to adoption of agricultural technologies. We used incentive compatible Becker‐DeGroot‐Marschak auctions to elicit willingness to pay for quality assured improved maize seed by 1,009 smallholder farmers, and conducted a randomised evaluation to test the effect of an information intervention on farmers’ knowledge of seed certification. Our results show that the randomised information treatment enhanced farmers’ knowledge of certified seed. However, using the information treatment as an instrumental variable for knowledge, we find no evidence of a causal effect of knowledge on willingness to pay, suggesting that even though farmers are information constrained, this constraint does not affect adoption of certified seed directly. Nevertheless, only 14% of sampled farmers were willing to pay the market price, which corresponds closely with actual observed demand for certified seed in the previous season. This suggests that there are other barriers to adoption than information and awareness.

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