Numerous studies of insight problem solving are focused on both the control and storage systems of working memory. We obtained contradictory data about how working memory systems are involved in insight problem solving process. We argue that measuring the dynamics of the control system and storage systems through the course of problem solving can provide a more refined view on the processes involved, as a whole, and explain the existing controversies. We theorize that specific insight mechanisms require varying working memory capacities at different stages of the problem solving process. Our study employed a dual task paradigm to track the dynamics of working memory systems load during problem solving by measuring the reaction time in a secondary probe-task during different stages of problem solving. We varied the modality (verbal, visual) and the complexity of the probe-task during insight and non-insight problem solving. The results indicated that the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems differs from those in non-insight problems. Our first experiment shows that the complexity of the probe-task affects overall probe-task reaction times in both insight and non-insight problem solving. Our second experiment demonstrates that the solution of a non-insight problem is primarily associated with the working memory control system, while insight problems rely on relevant storage systems. Our results confirm that insight process requires access to various systems of working memory throughout the solution. We found that working memory load in non-insight problems increases from stage to stage due to allocation of the attentional control resources to interim calculations. The nature of the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems remains debatable. We claim that insight problem solving demands working memory storage during the entire problem solving process and that control system plays an important role just prior to the solution.

The main goal of the work is to examine possibilities and limitations of solver’s metacognitive monitoring using emotional feedback in the process of insight problem solving. In the research participants solved Katona’s Five-Square problem. During the solution participants received feedback as emotional stimuli: negative or positive. To control nonspecific influence of emotions on problem solving emotional feedback was given only when participants made moves. Feedback was either congruent (for example, positive — correct move, negative — incorrect) or non-congruent (for example, positive — incorrect, negative — correct). We did not reveal the effect of emotional congruency, but showed that positive emotional feedback facilitates solution of the insight problem. The paper discusses possible limitations of experimental design that do not allow making unambiguous conclusions about emotional feedback in the process of insight problem solving.

The paper explores an option to expand the model of mechanisms of insight problem solving proposed by S. Ohlsson. The proposed mechanisms of insight problem solving — chunk decomposition and constraint relaxation — considered within the framework of high-level and low-level processes. Chunk decomposition described as low-level mechanism and constraint relaxation as high-level mechanism. We assume that difficulty of the different insight problems can be explained by high level chunk decomposition and low-level constraint relaxation. The paper describes two experiments dedicated to verify the assumption. The first experiment examines process of solving anagrams (with word) as high-level chunk decomposition. The main results of the experiment show the prospect of distinguishing the semantic chunk decomposition as insight problem solving mechanism. The second experiment use nine-dot insight problem to examine its solution process as relaxation of low-level (perceptual) constraints. Based on the results of the experiments, it can be considered possible to conclude that the expansion of S. Ohlsson’s model of mechanisms of insight problem solving allows to deem the solutions of various problems in a unified system.

The article presents some results of a qualitative study of the phenomenology of perception of art. As the main results, we received an aesthetic preference for the directions of realism and impressionism by most of the subjects. Aesthetic experience can be described in the categories of rational and emotional. The aesthetic evaluation of paintings is dominated by rational categories. The category of emotional is highly differentiated and includes various types of emotions: ethical, aesthetic, hedonistic and everyday.