As globalization and other pressures intensify the economic, social and biophysical connections between people and places, it seems likely that adaptation responses intended to ameliorate the impacts of climate change might end up shifting risks and vulnerability between people and places. Building on earlier conceptual work in maladaptation and other literature, this article explores the extent to which concerns about vulnerability redistribution have influenced different realms of adaptation practice. The review leads us to conclude that the potential for adaptation to redistribute risk or vulnerability is being given only sparse-and typically superficial-attention by practitioners. Concerns about 'maladaptation', and occasionally vulnerability redistribution specifically, are mentioned on the margins but do not significantly influence the way adaptation choices are made or evaluated by policy makers, project planners or international funds. In research, the conceptual work on maladaptation is yet to translate into a significant body of empirical literature on the distributional impacts of real-world adaptation activities, which we argue calls into question our current knowledge base about adaptation. These gaps are troubling, because a process of cascading adaptation endeavors globally seems likely to eventually re-distribute risks or vulnerabilities to communities that are already marginalized and vulnerable. We conclude by discussing the implications that the potential for vulnerability redistribution might have for the governance of adaptation processes, and offer some reflections on how research might contribute to addressing gaps in knowledge and in practice.

At the international level, India is emerging as a key actor in climate negotiations, while at the national and sub-national levels, the climate policy landscape is becoming more active and more ambitious. It is essential to unravel this complex landscape if we are to understand why policy looks the way it does, and the extent to which India might contribute to a future international framework for tackling climate change as well as how international parties might cooperate with and support India's domestic efforts. Drawing on both primary and secondary data, this paper analyzes the material and ideational drivers that are most strongly influencing policy choices at different levels, from international negotiations down to individual states. We argue that at each level of decision making in India, climate policy is embedded in wider policy concerns. In the international realm, it is being woven into broader foreign policy strategy, while domestically, it is being shaped to serve national and sub-national development interests. While our analysis highlights some common drivers at all levels, it also finds that their influences over policy are not uniform across the different arenas, and in some cases, they work in different ways at different levels of policy. We also indicate what this may mean for the likely acceptability within India of various climate policies being pushed at the international level.

The exponential growth in global populations, economic activity and resource utilization means it is becoming increasingly difficult to satisfy global demand for a number of fundamental resources, while some key ecosystems services are under stress. The likelihood of future resource scarcities have begun to influence the positions taken within international climate change negotiations by fast-growing developing countries. When Brazil, South Africa, India, and China formed the BASIC group it took many by surprise. The coordination needed to align this heterogeneous group of countries cannot simply be understood in terms of a set of shared interests around climate policy. How the BASIC group emerged and the nature of its cooperation on climate change are examined within the broader context in which these increasingly powerful countries came to join forces. Although traditionally aligned with the G77 group of developing countries, recent strategising as a group of emerging economies reflects their realization that there are insufficient global resources available to follow the same development pathway as industrialized countries. Hence, they must seek alternative growth pathways, which requires establishing common ground while also keeping track of each others' positions on important global issues like climate change.

Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, international financial assistance is expected to support African and other developing countries as they prepare for and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The impact of this finance depends on how much finance is mobilized and where it is targeted. However, there has been no comprehensive quantitative mapping of adaptationrelated finance flows to African countries to date. Here we track development finance principally targeting adaptation from bilateral and multilateral funders to Africa between 2014 and 2018. We find that the amounts of finance are well below the scale of investment needed for adaptation in Africa, which is a region with high vulnerability to climate change and low adaptation capacity. Finance targeting mitigation (US$30.6 billion) was almost double that for adaptation (US $16.5 billion). The relative share of each varies greatly among African countries. More adaptation-related finance was provided as loans (57%) than grants (42%) and half the adaptation finance has targeted just two sectors: agriculture; and water supply and sanitation. Disbursement ratios for adaptation in this period are 46%, much lower than for total development finance in Africa (at 96%). These are all problematic patterns for Africa, highlighting that more adaptation finance and targeted efforts are needed to ensure that financial commitments translate into meaningful change on the ground for African communities. Key policy insights. Between 2014 and 2018, adaptation-related finance committed by bilateral and multilateral funders to African countries remained well below US$5.5 billion per year, or roughly US$5 per person per year; these amounts are well below the estimates of adaptation costs in Africa. . Funders have not strategically targeted support for adaptation activities towards the most vulnerable to climate change African countries. . Lessons from countries that have been more successful in accessing finance point to the value of more sophisticated domestic adaptation policies and plans; of alignment with priorities of the NDC; of meeting funding requirements of specific funders; and of the strategic use of climate funds by national planners. . A low adaptation finance disbursement ratio in this period in Africa (at 46%) relates to barriers impeding the full implementation of adaptation projects: low grant to loan ratio; requirements for co-financing; rigid rules of climate funds; and inadequate programming capacity within many countries.

Background: Energy is given high priority in the national development agendas of most Small Island Developing States (SIDS) because it is intertwined with social, economic and environmental challenges. Many SIDS experience heavy fiscal burdens associated with imported fuels, some have very low electricity access rates, and islands also have a strong interest in the transition to cleaner energy because they are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This paper presents a global mapping of development finance for SIDS' energy sectors. We analyse whether energy aid has increased following international commitments to support developing countries tackle climate change and whether this is supporting renewable energy, whether finance has been targeted to different recipient countries based on either their income status or their electricity access rates and whether electricity access rates have substantially improved during this time, and whether financial commitments are actually being disbursed. Methods: Focusing mainly on the period 2002-2016, we use data reported by bilateral and multilateral sources to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee on financial support to 37 SIDS. Our analysis includes almost 5700 energy-related transactions between 2002 and 2016. Data on populations and electricity access rates of individual countries come from the World Bank's Open Data platform. Results: We observe an increase in funding since 2009 and a shift towards renewables, and solar particularly, though oil-fired plants and other non-renewables continue to be funded. Energy aid is unevenly spread between SIDS, on a total and a per capita basis. There is little correlation between the allocations made to individual countries and either their income or energy access gaps, and improvements in electricity access have been slow in those countries where the gap is largest. We also identify low disbursement rates, suggesting implementation problems. Conclusions: There is an urgent need to improve the quantity and quality of aid to help SIDS tackle their significant energy challenges. While the trend towards more funding for renewables is positive, low disbursement levels and limited support for strengthening local human and institutional capacities may be limiting its effectiveness.