We analyze a unique episode in the history of monetary economics, the 2016 Indian "demonetization." This policy made 86% of cash in circulation illegal tender overnight, with new notes gradually introduced over the next several months. We present a model of demonetization where agents hold cash both to satisfy a cash-in-advance constraint and for tax evasion purposes. We test the predictions of the model in the cross-section of Indian districts using several novel data sets including: the geographic distribution of demonetized and new notes for causal inference; nightlight activity and employment surveys to measure economic activity including in the informal sector; debit/credit cards and e-wallet transactions data; and banking data on deposit and credit growth. Districts experiencing more severe demonetization had relative reductions in economic activity, faster adoption of alternative payment technologies, and lower bank credit growth. The cross-sectional responses cumulate to a contraction in employment and nightlights-based output due to demonetization of 2 p.p. and of bank credit of 2 p.p. in 2016Q4 relative to their counterfactual paths, effects which dissipate over the next few months. These cumulated effects provide a lower bound for the aggregate effects of demonetization. Our analysis rejects money non-neutrality using a large scale natural experiment, something that is yet rare in the vast literature on the effects of monetary policy.

We analyze a unique episode in the history of monetary economics, the 2016 Indian “demonetization.” This policy made 86% of cash in circulation illegal tender overnight, with new notes gradually introduced over the next several months. We present a model of demonetization where agents hold cash both to satisfy a cash-in-advance constraint and for tax evasion purposes. We test the predictions of the model in the cross-section of Indian districts using several novel data sets including: the geographic distribution of demonetized and new notes for causal inference; night light activity and employment surveys to measure economic activity including in the informal sector; debit/credit cards and e-wallet transactions data; and banking data on deposit and credit growth. Districts experiencing more severe demonetization had relative reductions in economic activity, faster adoption of alternative payment technologies, and lower bank credit growth. The cross-sectional responses cumulate to a contraction in aggregate employment and night lights–based output due to the the cash shortage of at least 2 percentage points and of bank credit of 2 percentage points in 2016Q4 relative to their counterfactual paths, effects that dissipate over the next few months. Our analysis rejects monetary neutrality using a large-scale natural experiment, something that is still rare in the vast literature on the effects of monetary policy.

No abstract

The recent demonetization exercise in India is a unique monetary experiment that made 86 percent of the total currency in circulation invalid. In a country where currency in circulation constitutes 12 percent of GDP, the policy turned out to be a purely exogenous macroeconomic shock that affected all agents of the economy. This paper documents the impact of this macroeconomic shock on one such systematically important agent of the economy: the household. By construction, the policy helped households with bank accounts in disposing of the demonetized cash. We use a new household-level data set to tease out the effects of this policy on households with no bank accounts relative to households with bank accounts. Our results show that the impact of demonetization on household income and expenditure has been transient with the major impact being seen in December-2016. We find that households with no bank accounts experienced a significant decrease in both income and expenditure in December-2016. There is significant heterogeneity in the impact across households in different asset classes. We also show evidence of recovery of household finances whereby households were able to smooth out consumption during the post-demonetization period. However, this recovery phase is associated with an increase in household borrowing from different sources, primarily for the purpose of consumption. In particular, informal borrowing (money lenders, shops) increased substantially during this period. Thus, the policy although transient in nature, contributed to the unintended consequence of increased leverage for households.