No abstract

No abstract

Purpose – The lessons and merits of changes in the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities are still debated and are a major policy issue. Prior studies provide mixed evidences on the economic consequences of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the impact of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure on managers’ risk-management behavior. More importantly, this paper aims to investigate the role of product market competition on the impact of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure on managers’ risk-management behavior. Design/methodology/approach – This paper tests the author ' s hypotheses using the fixed-effects estimation technique, where it includes firm dummies in all the regressions. This approach enables to control for unobserved firm effects (fixed effects) on firms’ risk-management behavior that are assumed to be constant through time but vary across firms. Findings – The author finds that mandatory recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities, on average, decreases firms’ market rate risk exposure. This finding suggests that after the implementation of the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), firms engage in more prudent risk-management activities to mitigate the potential cost of earnings volatility imposed by the standard. However, the decrease in market rate risk exposure is lower when the level of product market competition is higher. This finding is consistent with the idea that the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities required by SFAS 133 unintentionally forces firms in competitive industries to engage in significant risk-taking. The result suggests that more disclosure in risk management may change risk-management incentives in undesirable ways if firms face the threat of entry in their product markets. Practical/implications – The results provide a new understanding on the role of product market competition on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure. The findings imply that standard setters should take product market competition into consideration before making derivative instruments and hedging activities ' recognition and disclosure mandatory for all firms. Originality/value – The paper contributes to the accounting literature by providing a new insight into the moderating role of product market competition in the accounting recognition and disclosure regulation and firms’ reporting behavior relation. Moreover, the paper extends the current literature on the effects of SFAS 133 on risk-management activities and sheds light on the impact of accounting regulations on firms’ real economic behavior.

This study investigates whether the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 (SFAS 133) influences firms' income smoothing via discretionary accruals decisions. Moreover, we investigate whether the level of hedge effectiveness and market volatility affects the impact of SFAS 133 on firms' income smoothing via discretionary accruals decisions. Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant increase in income smoothing via discretionary accruals activity after the adoption of SFAS 133. We also find that income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133 increases with the level of hedge ineffectiveness. By contrast, we find that perfect hedgers do not engage in more income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133. Finally, we find that the higher the market volatility is the larger the income smoothing is via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133. This implies that higher market volatility makes it more difficult for firms to meet hedge accounting requirements, thereby increasing unmanaged earnings volatility and income smoothing. Prior studies suggest that regulators are expressing concern about the effect of earnings management on the quality of reported earnings and the functioning of capital markets (e.g., Barton, 2001). In this ---

No abstract