The recent success of Foldit in determining the structure of the Mason-Pfizer monkey virus (M-PMV) retroviral protease is suggestive of the power-solving potential of internet-facilitated game-like crowdsourcing. This research model is highly novel, however, and thus, deserves careful consideration of potential ethical issues. In this paper, we will demonstrate that the crowdsourcing model of research has the potential to cause harm to participants, manipulates the participant into continued participation, and uses participants as experimental subjects. We conclude that protocols relying on this model require institutional review board (IRB) scrutiny.

The debate over risk-related standards of decisional capacity remains one of the most important and unresolved challenges to our understanding of the demands of informed consent. On one hand, risk-related standards benefit from significant intuitive support. On the other hand, risk-related standards appear to be committed to asymmetrical capacity—a conceptual incoherence. This latter objection can be avoided by holding that risk-related standards are the result of evidential considerations introduced by (i) the reasonable person standard and (ii) the standing assumption that patients have capacity. This evidential approach to justifying risk-related standards of capacity avoids the most significant challenges faced by extant views while grounding risk-related standards in two fairly uncontroversial views in biomedical ethics.

Personal identity is critical to provider--patient interactions. Patients and doctors tend to self-select, ideally forming therapeutic units that maximise the patients' benefit. Recently, however, 'reality' has changed. The internet and virtual worlds such as Second Life (http://www.secondlife.com/) allow models of identity and provider--patient interactions that go beyond the limits of mainstream personal identity. In this paper some of the ethical implications of virtual patient--provider interactions, especially those that have to do with personal identity, are explored.

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The behavior analytic literature on neurodiversity remains limited. This article aims to begin filling the lacuna. We will introduce the neurodiversity perspective and demonstrate an important congruence between the behavior analytic and neurodiversity perspectives on autism. Despite this congruence, applied behavior analysis is often targeted for criticism by proponents of the neurodiversity perspective. A central concern raises questions about the aims of behavior analytic interventions for clients with autism. Is it appropriate to teach clients with autism to behave as if they were neurotypical? Concerns about the aims of behavior analytic interventions mirror concerns that have been raised about the aims of language education in schools. Drawing on the literature regarding linguistically diverse classrooms, we will critically evaluate the abolitionist neurodiversity critique of ABA. We conclude by considering both concrete and theoretical implications for the ethics of behavior analytic work with autistic clients.