The attempt by Biafra to secede from the federation provoked the Nigerian Civil War that raged for almost three years. Oil was one of its major causes. Shell-BP was a British multinational company that had dominated the exploration process of the Nigerian oil industry since the 1950s. This study focuses on Shell BP's dilemma in Nigeria during the civil war era (1967-1970). By using relevant primary and secondary sources, the paper explores the complexities that surround Shell-BP's position either on the side of Federal government in Lagos through which it got its operating license or the Biafra government in the East that was desperate to secede from the federation. The paper further highlights the economic value of Shell-BP's investment in oil exploration, its position during the civil war barely eleven years of oil production in eastern and mid-western Nigeria, problem of royalties' payment in the face of dreadful threat to installations by Biafran troops, and the involvement of British government. The major findings of the paper show that despite Shell-BP's claim of non-partisanship, its exploration activities went on almost smoothly for the larger part of the war period. This feat could have been achieved by Shell-BP only with payment of adequate royalties to the federal government, and at the same time payment of certain undisclosed token to the Biafran leaders to avoid severe damage to its installations. This study contributes to the existing knowledge on oil and war, particularly the conflict of interests associated with oil companies, the government and other stakeholders. It also contends that it is difficult for any oil company to be completely non-partisan in the conduct of its business activities in a country like Nigeria. The paper concludes that the circumstances of war era compelled Shell-BP to adopt the strategy of constructive negotiation with the Biafran leaders without undermining the Federal Government.

The causes of low oil production from wells includes skin, low permeability and high rate of pressure depletion among other factors. Skin is a major challenge in oil production because it causes additional pressure drop around the wellbore. Hence, there is a drop in oil flow from the resevoir to surface facilities. Skin could be as a result of formation damage, poor production practices, well deviation, and poor well completion. The effect of skin is measured using skin factor which is a dimensionless parameter. A positive value of the skin factor indicates flow restriction while a negative value indicates a stimulated reservoir. Pressure maintenance is a method used to increase oil recovery from the reservoir by maintaining the reservoir pressure above the bubble point pressure of the reservoir. In this study, water injection was used as the method of pressure maintenance. The results showed that skin factor has much effect on oil production despite the pressure maintenance carried out in the reservoir; the rate of oil production was hindered depending on the value of the skin factor for the well. Oil reservoirs are more sensitive to skin despite pressure maintenance and in some scenario the skin even had a greater effect. Also, for wells in a reservoir having high skin factor, it is advisable to reduce the injection pressure and flowrate. The voidage replacement ratio should be recalculated to consider the outflow from the wells. The simulation resuts also showed that for reservoir with wells having high skin factor, pressure maintenance is very risky because this could lead to over pressure in the reservoir and when the reservoir pressure exceeds the fracture pressure of the reservoir rock, the reservoir fractures thus leading to loss of oil from the reservoir.

Decommissioning of oil and gas facilities in Nigeria is a relatively new activity. Decommissioning is essentially a set of activities undertaken to manage or dispose aged and worn-out Oil and Gas facilities. The idea of Decommissioning has become paramount in Nigeria due to aging of assets and mature fields operations as they are approaching the end of their economic life. However, presently no facility has ever been decommissioned in Nigeria. Decommissioning is an inherently hazardous exercise that requires meticulous planning, cognate experience, efficient management and other relevant defined skill set for it to be successful. This paper dwells on how to harness the opportunities that come with Decommissioning as well as suggest ways to mitigate some of its challenges. The challenges could be technical, economic, environmental, and legal, but could be further narrowed to include but not limited to poor information management, inadequate regulatory readiness, poor talent management, waste management disposal, lack of previous experience, poor supply chain management, and low portfolio management. While opportunities include securing direct and indirect employment and procurement to home nationals, which in turn could foster the development of local skills, technology transfer, and use of local manpower in capital projects.

Globally, there are two types of petroleum fiscal system; the concessionary and the contractual petroleum fiscal system. The main differences between the two types of petroleum fiscal system is the ownership of the resources and some distinct fiscal terms. The contractual petroleum fiscal system specifies a cost recovery option and profit oil split unlike the concessionary petroleum fiscal system that allows the contractor to recoup his capital before payment of tax. This tends to increase the risk associated with the host government revenue as investment in the production of hydrocarbon is filled with uncertainties. There is a need to redesign the concessionary petroleum fiscal to enable it reduce the risk associated with the host government revenue by making the host government to earn revenue early from petroleum investment. This research therefore evaluated a hybrid petroleum fiscal system for investment in the exploration and production of hydrocarbon. The concessionary petroleum fiscal system was adjusted to include a cost recovery option. Petroleum economic model for investment in a typical onshore oil field was built using spreadsheet modelling technique with the fiscal terms in the hybrid petroleum fiscal system embedded in it. The cost recovery option and oil price in the model were varied between 0-100% and $20-$100 per barrel. The NCF, IRR and payout period of the investment were determined. It was observed that the lower the cost recovery option, the higher the host government revenue. From the profitability analysis of the investment in the hybrid petroleum fiscal system, it was observed that when the price of oil was $100/bbl, the NCF of the host government was $9146 and $8426.3 for 0% and 80% cost recovery option. The lower the cost recovery option, the higher the payout period and the lower the internal rate of return. Though lower cost recovery increased the host government revenue more but it may make the hybrid petroleum fiscal system unattractive for investment in periods of low oil price. Hence a higher cost recovery option was recommended for the use of this type of petroleum fiscal system.