Democratic states often wield coercive force against ordinary people, yet little is known about the electoral consequences thereof. We analyze how incumbent electoral support in South Africa was affected by the Marikana massacre, one of the most high-profile examples of state violence in contemporary democratic Africa, using panel data constructed from polling station returns. In communities proximate to the violence the incumbent party was punished at the polls. We investigate the sources of this change using survey data, and find that these effects are almost exclusively driven by voters switching to a new opposition party that formed in the wake of the massacre, rather than (de-)mobilization. These findings suggest two lessons about the promises and limits of electoral accountability in the context of state violence.

Democratic governments sometimes use violence against their people, yet little is known about the electoral consequences of these events. Studying South Africa’s Marikana massacre, we document how a new opposition party formed as a direct result of violence, quantify significant electoral losses for the incumbent, and show that those losses were driven by voters switching from the incumbent to the new party. Three lessons emerge. First, incumbents who preside over state violence may be held electorally accountable by voters. Second, such accountability seemingly depends on the existence of credible opposition parties that can serve as a vector for disaffected voters. Where such parties do not exist, violence may create political cleavages that facilitate the formalization of opposition movements. Third, immediate proximity to violence is correlated with holding incumbents accountable.