We reformulate a key definition given by Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) to provide semantics for public announcements in subset spaces. More precisely, we interpret the precondition for a public announcement of ϕ to be the "local truth" of ϕ, semantically rendered via an interior operator. This is closely related to the notion of ϕ being "knowable". We argue that these revised semantics improve on the original and offer several motivating examples to this effect. A key insight that emerges is the crucial role of topological structure in this setting. Finally, we provide a simple axiomatization of the resulting logic and prove completeness.

In Savage's classic decision-theoretic framework [12], actions are formally defined as functions from states to outcomes. But where do the state space and outcome space come from? Expanding on recent work by Blume, Easley, and Halpern [3], we consider a language-based framework in which actions are identified with (conditional) descriptions in a simple underlying language, while states and outcomes (along with probabilities and utilities) are constructed as part of a representation theorem. Our work expands the role of language from that in [3] by using it not only for the conditions that determine which actions are taken, but also the effects. More precisely, we take the set of actions to be built from those of the form do(ϕ), for formulas ϕ in the underlying language. This presents a problem: how do we interpret the result of do(ϕ) when ϕ is underspecified (i.e., compatible with multiple states)? We answer this using tools familiar from the semantics of counterfactuals [13]: roughly speaking, do(ϕ) maps each state to the "closest" ϕ-state. This notion of "closest" is also something we construct as part of the representation theorem; in effect, then, we prove that (under appropriate assumptions) the agent is acting as if each underspecified action is first made definite and then evaluated (i.e., by maximizing expected utility). Of course, actions in the real world are often not presented in a fully precise manner, yet agents reason about and form preferences among them all the same. Our work brings the abstract tools of decision theory into closer contact with such real-world scenarios.

In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge [30]. Building on Stalnaker's core insights, and using frameworks developed in [11] and [4], we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker "evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.

We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our models allow the set of possible worlds that a piece of evidence corresponds to to vary from one possible world to another, and therefore itself be the subject of uncertainty. Such structures can be viewed as (epistemically motivated) generalizations of topological spaces. In this context, there arises a natural distinction between what is actually entailed by the evidence and what the agent knows is entailed by the evidence-with the latter, in general, being much weaker. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the corresponding bi-modal logic of knowledge and evidence entailment, and investigate some natural extensions of this core system, including the addition of a belief modality and its interaction with evidence interpretation and entailment, and the addition of a "knowability" modality interpreted via a (generalized) interior operator.

In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge [33]. Building on Stalnaker's core insights, and using frameworks developed in [12] and [4], we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker "evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.