The aim of this study was to analyse transfer of mechanical energy between body segments during the glide shot put. A group of eight elite throwers from the Polish National Team was analysed in the study. Motion analysis of each throw was recorded using an optoelectronic Vicon system composed of nine infrared camcorders and Kistler force plates. The power and energy were computed for the phase of final acceleration of the glide shot put. The data were normalized with respect to time using the algorithm of the fifth order spline and their values were interpolated with respect to the percentage of total time, assuming that the time of the final weight acceleration movement was different for each putter. Statistically significant transfer was found in the study group between the following segments: Right Knee – Right Hip (p = 0.0035), Left Hip - Torso (p = 0.0201), Torso – Right Shoulder (p = 0.0122) and Right Elbow – Right Wrist (p = 0.0001). Furthermore, the results of cluster analysis showed that the kinetic chain used during the final shot acceleration movement had two different models. Differences between the groups were revealed mainly in the energy generated by the hips and trunk.

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In this paper, I consider whether the critical rationalist philosophy of science may provide a rationale for trusting scientific knowledge. In the first part, I refer to several insights of Karl Popper’s social and political philosophy in order to see whether they may be of help in offsetting the distrust of science spawned by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second part, I address the more general issue of whether the theoretical principles of the critical rationalist philosophy of science may afford a foundation for building trust in science. Both parts of the discussion, confined for the sake of the argument largely to the repudiation of the concept of good reasons for considering a theory to be true, imply that this question would have to be answered negatively. Against this, I argue that such a conclusion is based on a misconception of the nature of scientific knowledge: critical rationalism views science as a cognitive regime which calls for bold theories and at the same time demands a rigorous and continuous distrust towards them, and it is precisely this attitude that should be adopted as a compelling argument for trusting science.

The global lockdown following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to generate all sorts of consequences: psychological, social, economic, and political. To hypothesize about what will emerge from the present situation is at this point both premature and impossible. The impossibility comes primarily from the gravity and vastness of this emergency and from the lack of intellectual resources to deal with the challenge. At the same time, however, the need to get a grasp of the condition in which we have found ourselves is both understandable and irresistible. One way of responding, at least partially, to the demand and its possible consequences may be to refer to the concept of abstract society, an idea formulated 75 years ago by the Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper.