Typologies like Ian Barbour's have been widely used—and critiqued—in religion‐and‐science. Several alternatives have been proposed by, for example, John Haught, Willem Drees, Mikael Stenmark, and Shoaib Ahmed Malik. However, there has been a surprising deficit in discussion of what we wish typologies to do in religion and science in the first place. In this article, I provide a general analysis of typologies in religion‐and‐science by (1) providing a classification of existing typologies as conclusion‐ or concept‐oriented; (2) showing that typologies are used, or expected to be used, as first‐order categorizations of how religion and science are related and as second‐order classifications of scholars/scholarly works; (3) discussing several aims which we might want typologies to achieve in their second‐order usage; and (4) presenting a new kind of typology focused on the methods used by scholars which achieves those aims in a unique way.