Summary Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programmes have been considered an important conservation mechanism to avoid deforestation. These environmental policies act in social and ecological contexts at different spatial scales. We evaluated the social-ecological fit between stakeholders and ecosystem processes in a local PES programme across three levels: social, ecological and social-ecological. We explored collaboration among stakeholders, assessed connectivity between forest units and evaluated conservation activity links between stakeholders and forest units. In addition, to increase programme effectiveness, we classified forest units based on their social and ecological importance. Our main findings suggest that non-governmental organizations occupy brokerage positions between landowners and government in a dense collaboration network. We also found a partial spatial misfit between conservation activity links and the forest units that provide the most hydrological services to Xalapa. We conclude that conservation efforts should be directed towards the middle and high part of the Pixquiac sub-watershed and that the role of non-governmental organizations as mediators should be strengthened to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the local PES programme.

This paper aims to provide evidence on how the concurrence of multiple carbon markets in Mexico that differ in regulation ―highly regulated, semiregulated, unregulated― can affect the ability of actors to coordinate their actions. It follows the implementation of a carbon-offset project in Mexico called Scolel Te over time. Based on the social exchange theory, we show that the concurrence of multiple carbon markets with different degrees of regulation can influence the tactics or competitive strategies of actors in the network. In particular, it encourages changes in actors’ strategies (balancing operations) in the network to minimize regulatory costs and to become competitive by attracting financial resources to the project. Another finding is that the emergence of an unregulated local carbon market in Mexico creates unintended incentives for actors to adopt less environmentally responsible strategies and avoid participation in more environmentally responsible markets, such as Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs).

Formar capital social para la apropiación colectiva favorece la conservación de los ecosistemas forestales de propiedad social. En México, la propiedad social alberga 60% de los ecosistemas forestales, y en éstos coexisten mezclas individuales y colectivas de apropiación. Mediante la acción colectiva, se estudió la organización del trabajo, los lazos de parentesco inscritos en ella y su expresión en ámbitos individuales y colectivos en cinco ejidos de Tabasco y Chiapas, con objeto de examinar la territorialización del capital social para la apropiación forestal comunitaria. Los resultados reflejan un incipiente proceso de construcción del capital social para la acción colectiva y una estructura comunitaria fragmentada.

The new demand for institutions to cope with both broadening and deepening interdependencies in the environmental global context has created the need for co-operation and co-ordination between individuals and social groups at the international level. In this context, local environmental needs are not easily incorporated into the global agenda, largely dominated by global organizations highly influenced by the governments of developed countries and large international NGOs. The domination of the international environmental agenda by strong global actors obviously limits the ability of poor countries and local communities to properly address their specific needs.This paper assesses the role played by NGOs in environmental networks in the context of the implementation of a carbon reduction project in Bananal, Brazil. The analysis shows that NGOs can either help or hinder the incorporation of global and local issues into the environmental agenda. In particular, the case study analyzed here suggests that the nature of the links between participants in an environmental network is the main factor determining the benefits obtained by each member. The case of Bananal shows how by studying the nature of the links, it is possible to determine the distribution of power and the degree of dependence of each participant as well as his or her influence on the decision-making power of other network members.