A popular soccer myth states that teams affected by a sending-off perform better than they would have performed without the penalty. Based on economic theory, we analyze the course of soccer matches using data from the German Bundesliga from 1999 to 2009. The results show that sending-offs affecting home teams have a negative impact on their performance. However, for guest teams the impact of a sending-off on their performance depends on the time remaining after the sending-off. Thus, the "ten do it better" myth seems to hold for guest teams to a certain extent.

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Leadership has been deemed, by some earlier scholars, to be less necessary in organizations that are knowledge-intensive. It has been assumed that because experts and professionals are driven largely by intrinsic motivation, extrinsic management and leadership factors are less important. We believe this assumption is wrong. Leaders have been shown in recent studies to have a considerable influence on organizational performance in universities, research institutes, hospitals and in high-skill sports settings. What matters, we argue, is the kind of leader. Experts and professionals need to be led by other experts and professionals, those who have a deep understanding of and high ability in the core-business of their organization. Our contribution will summarize the literature on the relationship between expert leaders and organizational performance, and then we will present a theory of expert leadership in a new model that outlines the possible transfer processes through which expert leaders generate better organizational performance.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper analyzes experimentally how the interaction of task meaning and peer presence affects work effort. We build on the experimental designs of Falk and Ichino (2006) and Ariely et al. (2008). Confirming previous results from the literature, we find positive peer effects and negative effects of low task meaning. In addition, we find that peer effects are even stronger if task meaning is low. We conclude that a peer setting is able to overcome the negative effort effect of low task meaning. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may