This article explores the influence of politics and institutions on poverty and inequality. It first considers the general contention that poverty is shaped by the combination of power resources and institutions. On one hand, scholars in the power resources tradition have emphasized the role of class-based collective political actors for mobilizing “power resources” in the state and economy. On the other hand, institutionalists have highlighted the role of formal rules and regulations. The article goes on to discuss the theoretical arguments of power resources theory and the evidence for key power resources (that is, collective political actors like labor unions and parties). It also reviews institutional explanations, focusing on the key concepts and theories and as well as the evidence linking the most salient institutions to poverty. Finally, it examines how state policy influences poverty and presents several challenges for future research.

No abstract

Prominent research has claimed that work–family reconciliation policies trigger ‘tradeoffs’ and ‘paradoxes’ in terms of gender equality with adverse labor market consequences for women. These claims have greatly influenced debates regarding social policy, work, family and gender inequality. Motivated by limitations of prior research, we analyze the relationship between the two most prominent work–family reconciliation policies (paid parental leave and public childcare coverage) and seven labor market outcomes (employment, full-time employment, earnings, full-time earnings, being a manager, being a lucrative manager and occupation percent female). We estimate multilevel models of individuals nested in a cross-section of 21 rich democracies near 2005, and two-way fixed effects models of individuals nested in a panel of 12 rich democracies over time. The vast majority of coefficients for work–family policies fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effects. The pattern of insignificance occurs regardless of which set of models or coefficients one compares. Moreover, there is as much evidence that significantly contradicts the ‘tradeoff hypothesis’ as is consistent with the hypothesis. Altogether, the analyses undermine claims that work–family reconciliation policies trigger trade-offs and paradoxes in terms of gender equality with adverse labor market consequences for women.

Early childhood education and care (ECEC) is seen as a crucial element of the social investment state. Whilst the extent of social investment in ECEC depends on financial expenditure, its effectiveness depends on certain conditions being met, namely affordable, high quality provision being available. We explore policy development and the role played by government in the funding, provision and regulation of ECEC in England, France and Germany and then compare them in terms of availability, affordability and quality. We argue that for children aged three and over, social investment can be deemed to be broadly effective in France and Germany, but in England quality is compromised by low staff qualification levels in private childcare centres. For children under three, effective social investment is elusive in all countries although as a result of different conditions not being met. Our findings lead us to question the limitations of the concept of social investment in ECEC, particularly in marketised contexts.

Prominent research has claimed that work-family reconciliation policies trigger “tradeoffs” and “paradoxes” in terms of gender equality with adverse labor market consequences for women. These claims have greatly influenced debates regarding social policy, work, family, and gender inequality. Motivated by limitations of prior research, we analyze the relationship between the two most prominent work-family reconciliation policies (paid parental leave and public childcare coverage) and seven labor market outcomes (employment, full-time employment, earnings, full-time earnings, being a manager, being a lucrative manager, and occupation percent female). We estimate multi-level models of individuals nested in a cross-section of 21 rich democracies near 2005, and two-way fixed effects models of individuals nested in a panel of 12 rich democracies over time. The vast majority of coefficients for work-family policies fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effects. The pattern of insignificance occurs regardless of which set of models or coefficients one compares. Moreover, there is as much evidence that significantly contradicts the “tradeoff hypothesis” as is consistent with the hypothesis. Altogether, the analyses undermine claims that work-family reconciliation policies trigger tradeoffs and paradoxes in terms of gender equality with adverse labor market consequences for women.