Preference is an operative notion of sequential organization and interpersonal understanding in conversation analysis. The complexity of the phenomenon that we are attempting to grasp through this notion has manifested itself in the seemingly controversial widening of the interpretation of the notion. In this paper I argue that preference can be interpreted through an inference rule as a consequence of the simultaneous but not equal manifestation of pragmatic principles; a deeper and uncontroversial interpretation of the notion is possible if, in addition to a structural inference rule and interpersonality principles, we take into consideration the role of rationality principles as well. In every communicative situation an interpersonal concern and a topical concern is operative; in consensus-oriented contexts preference structure is regulated by interpersonality principles that govern interpersonal relations and self-projection, while in conflict-oriented discourse the most important role is played by rationality principles. Approaching preference from the perspective of pragmatic principles may prove instrumental in integrating conversation analysis more closely with new directions and results of pragmatic research. AimsIn this paper I attempt to clarify the nature of preference, considering that the use of this classical concept of conversation analysis (CA) which has an important part in interpreting utterances seems to have become confused and vague in the course of time. After reviewing the role of preference in CA in 2.1, in 2.2 through 2.5 I provide a critical survey of the interpretations of the term in the pragmatics literature. As a result of a reconsideration of the approaches at this issue, in 2.6 I suggest a complex interpretation of preference which unifies the different views from the perspective of pragmatic principles. In section 3, I investigate the manifestation of preference organization in verbal conflict sequences. In * I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions which helped improve the paper. All remaining shortcomings are, of course, my own responsibility. this part of this paper I argue that in order to grasp the nature of preference it is essential to investigate forms of agreements and disagreements in conflict talk. Section 4 summarizes the results.