This study is intended to find out the motives of cash holding in Chinese firms and theories associated with these motives. The study is unique because it not only estimates the adjustment speed of corporate cash holdings but also discuss several firm specific factors that affects cash holdings in Chinese firms with special reference to Chinese SOEs and NSOEs. An extensive set of panel data comprising 1632 A listed Chines firms, over a period from 2001 to 2013 are taken for analysis. The study reports a lower adjustment coefficient for Chinese firms compared to other developed nations. The study finds that target level of cash holdings in Chinese firms is better explained by Trade off and Pecking order theories. To cope with issues of endogeneity and serial correlation the study apply GMM and random effects model with an added AR (autoregressive) term. Keywords AbstractThis study is intended to find out the motives of cash holding in Chinese firms and theories associated with these motives. The study is unique because it not only estimates the adjustment speed of corporate cash holdings but also discuss several firm specific factors that affects cash holdings in Chinese firms with special reference to Chinese SOEs and NSOEs. An extensive set of panel data comprising 1632 A listed Chines firms, over a period from 2001 to 2013 are taken for analysis. The study reports a lower adjustment coefficient for Chinese firms compared to other developed nations. The study finds that target level of cash holdings in Chinese firms is better explained by Trade off and Pecking order theories.To cope with issues of endogeneity and serial correlation the study apply GMM and random effects model with an added AR (autoregressive) term. JEL Classification: M41, G34

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This study investigates the impact of corporate performance and corporate governance on executive remuneration in a Chinese market setting. Using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of 860 non-financial firms listed on Chinese Stock Exchanges over the 15 years period of 2004-2018, the study found a positive and significant association between corporate profitability and executive pay. The study further reports that ownership concentration is positively related to executive pay revealing an entrenchment effect i.e., collusion between large shareholders and top management. Consistent with managerial power and agency theory CEO duality exhibits a positive relationship with executive remuneration, while board size and board independence also reveal a positive association with executive pay, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing managerial entrenchment. Interestingly, non-state-owned enterprises report a negative relationship of board size with executive remuneration which means non-state-owned enterprises with larger board size tend to reduce executive pay because they may have better control and monitoring. Following the managerial power propositions, CEO duality weakens the performance sensitivity of executive pay, but contrary to agency theory the impact of board independence on this sensitivity is in contrast and weakens the relationship of managerial pay and performance, making the independent director's role ambiguous.

Purpose This study aims to examine the relationship between board capital and firm performance in the Chinese tourism industry. Design/methodology/approach The study’s sample includes firms from the Chinese hotel, air transportation/travel and catering industries. This study explores the governance environment in tourism industries. This study estimates three dimensions of the board, including education, expertise and directors interlock. These dimensions are further grouped as human capital (i.e. education and expertise), social capital (interlocks) and board capital (sum of social and human capital). Ordinary least square regressions with multiple robustness tests are used to investigate the effect of board capital on firm value in Chinese listed tourism firms during 2005–2018. Findings This study finds that board capital positively impacts firm performance in its dimensions of human and social capital. This study also highlights the two important ownership contexts, namely, institutional investors and state-ownership, that shape the board capital-firm performance association in the Chinese tourism industry. Practical implications The findings suggest that board capital plays a significant role in corporate decisions. The results illustrate that higher board capital improves both governance mechanisms and resource provision roles of the board, resulting in higher firm value. The results further offer implications for managers and shareholders of tourism firms when electing directors as shareholders’ representatives. Originality/value The study has two important contributions. First, it extends the prior literature of firm value by considering the board’s human and social dimensions in the tourism sector. Second, contrary to prior research on board, this study takes three facets of board capital, education, expertise and interlocks that improve governance mechanisms and bring new resources in the shape of skills, knowledge and expertise.

Grounded in the notion of speed of adjustment this study investigates the adjustment rate of corporate cash holdings and financial constraints in Chinese firms. For this purpose data of 867 A-listed Chinese firms over a 14 years period (2001-2014) is analysed. The study applies Arellano and Bond (GMM2) and Blundell and Bond (GMM1) dynamic panel data model to investigate asymmetric speed of adjustment. We report considerable evidence about asymmetric adjustment of corporate cash holdings, i.e., downward adjustment rate is significantly higher than upward adjustment rate. This higher downward adjustment rate holds even after controlling for financial constraints. Moreover financial constraints also play an important role in dynamic cash adjustment. Financially unconstrained firms are found to adjust faster to their target cash holdings as compared to financially constrained firms. The high speed of adjustment for above target cash level firms holds even after controlling for financial constraints.