The significance of circulating antibody to hepatitis C HCV E1 corresponds to the pestiviral gp33/gp25 envevirus (HCV) envelope glycoprotein 2 (E2)/nonstructural lope glycoprotein and the flaviviral envelope protein protein 1 (NS1) glycoprotein was studied in 83 patients (M/E), whereas E2/NS1 corresponds to the pestiviral with chronic HCV infection diagnosed by polymerase gp53/gp55 envelope glycoprotein and the flaviviral chain reaction (PCR). E2/NS1 antibody was quantita-NS1. 1 Based on the greater homology between HCV tively examined by a passive hemagglutination test us-and the pestiviruses 1,4-6 and the absence of HCV E2/ ing recombinant E2/NS1 glycoprotein encompassing NS1 secretion into the medium by transfected mammaamino acids 388 to 664 of the HCV-H strain. The results lian Chinese hamster ovary cells, it has been proposed were correlated with clinical and virological features such as genotypes and viremic levels assessed by a com-that E2/NS1 more likely represents a virion envelope petitive reverse-transcription PCR assay. E2/NS1 anti-glycoprotein than the secreted NS1 of the flaviviruses. body was found in 73 patients (88%), and its occurrence Both the pestiviral gp53/gp55 and flaviviral NS1 glycowas related to viremic levels. E2/NS1 antibody titers proteins are known to elicit protective antibodies in were low in asymptomatic HCV carriers with low levels hosts. 7,8 HCV envelope glycoproteins can be considered of viral replication; 9 of 17 such patients tested positive possible candidates for vaccination against HCV infecfor E2/NS1 antibody (53%), compared with 64 of 66 tion. 9 However, the implications of the E2/NS1 antichronic hepatitis C patients (97%) (P õ .01). A significant direct relationship was observed between viremic levels body response in chronic HCV infection are not fully and E2/NS1 antibody titers (r Å .52, P õ .01). Of the 13 understood.patients with low viremic levels of õ10 6 copies/mL, only

No abstract

No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study the implications of flexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of finite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to affect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise.The values of these state variables influence players' terminal payoffs at the deadline, as well as their flow payoffs. In contrast to the static case, the equilibrium is unique under a general class of terminal payoff functions. Our characterization of the equilibrium builds on recent developments in the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). We use this tool to analyze applications, including team production, hold-up problems, and dynamic contests. In a team production model, the unique equilibrium selects an efficient outcome when frictions vanish.