Personal autonomy is widely valued. Recognition of its vulnerability in health care contexts led to the inclusion of respect for autonomy as a key concern in biomedical ethics. The principle of respect for autonomy is usually associated with allowing or enabling patients to make their own decisions about which health care interventions they will or will not receive. In this paper, we suggest that a strong focus on decision situations is problematic, especially when combined with a tendency to stress the importance of patients' independence in choosing. It distracts attention from other important aspects of and challenges to autonomy in health care. Relational understandings of autonomy attempt to explain both the positive and negative implications of social relationships for individuals' autonomy. They suggest that many health care practices can affect autonomy by virtue of their effects not only on patients' treatment preferences and choices, but also on their self-identities, self-evaluations and capabilities for autonomy. Relational understandings de-emphasise independence and facilitate well-nuanced distinctions between forms of clinical communication that support and that undermine patients' autonomy. These understandings support recognition of the value of good patient-professional relationships and can enrich the specification of the principle of respect for autonomy.KEY WORDS: personal autonomy; professional-patient relations; clinical ethics; relationship-centred care.

Most accounts of the ethics of stem cell research are decontextualised reviews of the ethical and legal literature. In this chapter we present a socially embedded account of some of the ethical implications of stem cell research, from the perspectives of scientists directly involved in this area. Based on an ethnography of two leading embryonic stem cell laboratories in the UK, our data form part of the findings from a larger project mapping the scientific, medical, social and ethical dimensions of innovative stem cell treatment, focusing on the areas of liver cell and pancreatic islet cell transplantation. We explore three key issues: what individual scientists themselves view as ethical sources of human embryos and stem cells; their perceptions of human embryos and stem cells; and how scientists perceive regulatory frameworks in stem cell research. We argue that these dimensions of laboratory practice are all examples of 'ethical boundary-work', which is becoming an integral part of the routine practice and performance of biomedical science. Our work adds to the relatively few sociological studies that explore ethics in clinical settings and to an even smaller body of work that explores scientists' views on the ethical issues relating to their research.

Shared decision-making approaches, by recognizing the autonomy and responsibility of both health professionals and patients, aim for an ethical Ômiddle wayÕ between ÔpaternalisticÕ and ÔconsumeristÕ models of clinical decision making. Shared decision making has been understood in various ways. In this paper, we distinguish narrow and broader conceptions of shared decision making and explore their relative strengths and weaknesses. In the first part of the paper, we construct a summary characterization of an archetypal narrow conception of shared decision making (a conception that does not coincide with any specific published model but which reflects features of a variety of models). We show the shortcomings of such a conception and highlight the need to broaden out our thinking about shared decision making if the ethical (and instrumental) goals of shared decision making are to be realized. In the second part of the paper, we acknowledge and explore the advantages and disadvantages of operating with broader conceptions of shared decision making by considering the analogies between health professional-patient relationships and familiar examples of Ôopen-endedÕ relationships (e.g. friendships). We conclude by arguing that the illustrated Ôtrade-offsÕ between narrow conceptions (which may protect patients from inappropriately paternalistic professionals but preclude important forms of professional support) and broad conceptions (which render more forms of professional support legitimate but may require skills or virtues that not all health professionals possess) suggest the need to find ways, in principle and in practice, of taking seriously both patient autonomy and autonomy-supportive professional intervention.

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