Researchers have proposed that the emergence of religion was a cultural adaptation necessary for promoting self-control. Self-control, in turn, may serve as a psychological pillar supporting a myriad of adaptive psychological and behavioral tendencies. If this proposal is true, then subtle reminders of religious concepts should result in higher levels of self-control. In a series of four experiments, we consistently found that when religious themes were made implicitly salient, people exercised greater self-control, which, in turn, augmented their ability to make decisions in a number of behavioral domains that are theoretically relevant to both major religions and humans' evolutionary success. Furthermore, when self-control resources were minimized, making it difficult for people to exercise restraint on future unrelated self-control tasks, we found that implicit reminders of religious concepts refueled people's ability to exercise self-control. Moreover, compared with morality- or death-related concepts, religion had a unique influence on self-control.

People often perceive important and improbable life outcomes as "meant to happen," that is, predetermined and inevitable. In 4 studies, we constructed diverse measures of such fate attributions and examined the cultural correlates of this attributional tendency, focusing on ethnic culture and religious affiliation differences. Independently of ethnic culture, Christians were found to endorse fate attributions more than did the nonreligious; and independently of religious affiliation, East Asian Canadians attributed events to fate more than did European Canadians. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the religious affiliation difference was mediated by belief in God, whereas the ethnic cultural difference was mediated by a measure of causal complexity, although not by a measure of acculturation. Experimentally inducing thoughts of causal complexity in one domain increased fate attributions in unrelated domains. These results point to 2 independent psychological sources of fate attributions which also explain observed cultural differences in this tendency.

This article discusses the many important differences in the thinking styles between Chinese and European North Americans (Americans and Canadians of European descent), as Chinese thought processes have always been difficult to comprehend. That is why Westerners have expressed serious curiosity about and appreciation of the philosophical endeavours of the Chinese and the cognitive strategies they use for everyday functioning. The term ‘thinking styles’ represents the ontological frameworks that people use intuitively to make sense of their social world. It describes how Chinese favor a more holistic framework in processing information, whereas European North Americans rely on a more analytical framework that emphasizes the use of formal logic and one-to-one relationships. It further elaborates the concept of zhong yong, or the doctrine of the mean, a concept central to understanding Chinese thinking, which encapsulates the virtues of pursuing the middle ground.

People move close to things they like and away from things they dislike. Can the same be applied to temporal events? Through alternating between the ego-moving and time-moving metaphorical perspectives of time, people can manage the psychological distance between themselves and various temporal events by staying away from unpleasant experiences and bringing pleasant ones within reach. Consistent with theoretical predictions, 4 studies showed that recalling an unpleasant event from the past prompted the ego-moving perspective, whereas recalling a pleasant past event prompted the time-moving perspective. In contrast, anticipating a pleasant future invoked the ego-moving perspective, whereas anticipating an unpleasant future invoked the time-moving perspective. The valence of feelings explained the systematic shifts in how time is metaphorically understood. These findings highlight the role of basic psychological processes in temporal reasoning. Clinical implications for rumination and mood disorders are discussed.

We examined cultural differences in people’s lay theories of demeanor—how demeanor may be perceived as a straightforward and reliable reflection of reality (convergence theory) or as a deviating reflection of reality (divergence theory). Across different domains of competition, Euro-Canadians perceived greater competence in an opponent with a competent demeanor, whereas Chinese paradoxically perceived greater competence in an opponent with no signs of competence (Studies 1–4b). The results, unexplained by attributional styles (Study 1), likability (Study 3), or modesty (Study 3), suggest that Euro-Canadians endorse a stronger convergence theory than Chinese in their inferences of competence. Corroborated with qualitative data (Study 4a), such cultural differences were explained by the beliefs that demeanor can be a misleading reflection of reality, verified in college and community (Study 4b) samples. We discuss the implications for social perception, intergroup dynamics, and self-presentation in competitions.