This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs and requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, assesses the impact of disinformation and strategic political propaganda disseminated through online social media sites. It examines effects on the functioning of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in the EU and its Member States.The study formulates recommendations on how to tackle this threat to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It specifically addresses the role of social media platform providers in this regard.

Fake news is a symptom of deeper structural problems in our societies and media environments. To counter it, policymakers need to take into account the underlying, selfreinforcing mechanisms that make this old phenomenon so pervasive today. Only by taking a step back can we examine the vulnerabilities these fake news narratives exploit. This article provides a first taxonomy of anti-fake news approaches. It argues that proposed anti-fake news laws focus on the trees rather than the forest. As such, they will not only remain irrelevant but also aggravate the root causes fuelling the fake news phenomenon.

Due to its borderless nature, COVID-19 has been a matter of common European interest since its very first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been handled as an essentially national matter. Member States adopted their own different, uncoordinated and at times competing national responses according to their distinctive risk analysis frameworks, with little regard1 for the scientific and management advice provided by the European Union (EU), notably its dedicated legal framework for action on cross-border health threats.2 To justify such an outcome as the inevitable consequence of the EU’s limited competence in public health is a well-rehearsed yet largely inaccurate argument3 that calls for closer scrutiny.

'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?' asked the Roman poet Juvenal -'who will watch the watchers, who will guard the guardians?'1 As legislative and regulatory processes around the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, (Verschuuren and van Gestel 2009, Hahn andTetlock 2007), we ask: who oversees the regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and benefi cial, it can also impose its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, regulatory oversight -frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation. We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional actors, the Regulatory Oversight Bodies (ROBs). These bodies tend to be located in the executive (or sometimes the legislative) branch of government. They review the fl ow of new regulations using impact assessment and benefi t-cost analysis, and they sometimes also appraise existing regulations to measure and reduce regulatory burdens. Through these procedures of regulatory review, ROBs have become an integral aspect not only of regulatory reform programs in many countries, but also of their respective administrative systems.Although most academic attention focuses on the analytical tools used to improve the quality of legislation, such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) or benefi t-cost analysis, this chapter instead identifi es the key concepts and issues surrounding the establishment and operation of ROBs across governance systems. It does so by examining and comparing the oversight mechanisms that have been established in the United States and in the EU and by critically looking into their origins, rationales, mandates, institutional designs and scope of oversight.

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