Purpose This paper aims to investigate the extent to which corporate governance (CG) systems adopted by Latin American listed firms affect their cost of equity capital. Several studies on the link between the two aforementioned dimensions have been carried out, but none in the context of Latin American firms. Design/methodology/approach A CG index is created by taking into account the peculiarities of each country and the recommendations given by the corresponding CG institutes. In particular, to assess the level of CG quality, three sub-indexes have been identified: “Disclosure”, “Board of Directors” and “Shareholder Rights, Ownership and Control Structure”. Findings The results indicate a negative relationship between CG quality and the cost of equity. In particular, the “Disclosure” component is the one mostly affecting the cost of equity. Research limitations/implications This study contributes to the literature by adding knowledge on the relationship between CG and cost of capital considering, for the first time, the overall Latin American market. Practical implications The paper proves that institutional investors all over the world are disposed to pay a premium to invest in firms with effective CG standards; moreover, this premium is higher in emerging countries such as those analyzed in this paper, rather than in developed countries. Originality/value To the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper empirically investigating the relationship between CG and cost of capital in Latin America.

Purpose This study aims to examine whether particular corporate governance mechanisms influence the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Design/methodology/approach Regression analyses investigating 1,596 recent acquisitions in the US market completed over the five-year period from 2009 to 2013 are performed. Findings The results show that board independency, CEO duality and level of CEO fixed compensation have an impact on the return of acquisitions. Moreover, the findings indicate that acquisitions significantly create value for bidders delivering a positive cumulative abnormal return upon announcement. Finally, also focusing on the 690 relative larger deals, there is a clear evidence of a positive influence of good corporate governance mechanisms over the quality of acquisitions completed. Originality/value To our knowledge, this is the first paper trying to identify corporate governance mechanisms related to the best acquisition decisions, by using specifically the three corporate governance variables (CEO duality, CEO fixed compensation and board independency).

Credit market concentration, relationship lending and the cost of debt.

Credit market concentration, relationship lending and the cost of debt.

Previous research investigating cross-border M&As (CBM&As) by emerging economies (EEs) provided contrasting evidence on the value enhancement role of investor protection rules. We conduct a new empirical study to address the issue with an accurate sample selection of bidders from more homogeneous developing countries and transactions on developed countries only. Our analysis over the [1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012] period on a sample of M&A deals by companies from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) does not provide evidence that better institutional standards in the destination country are rewarded by the local stock market. We find that foreign governance quality is not associated with positive excess stock returns around the announcement date. Rather, these returns are affected by firm-specific and dealspecific factors, such as the relative deal size, the listed status of the target company, and the acquirer size. Comparison with other studies on excess returns for emerging markets (including BRICs) suggests that the results could be driven at least partially by country choice.