Commons and social-ecological systems research examines institutional arrangements for governing natural resources to improve social and ecological outcomes. However, no universal definition of success exists. We examine the CPR and SES synthesis literature to identify trends, gaps and challenges for examining success. We address: (1) gaps in the literature, (2) multidimensionality and tradeoffs, and (3) and the link between problem orientation and definitions of success. To do this we conduct a comprehensive review of Large-N studies, metaanalyses and systematic reviews of CPR and SES governance (n = 45). We found seven dimensions of success, corresponding to collective choice, constitutional and operational levels, temporal dimensions, and socioeconomic outcomes. Most studies did not address power and tradeoffs, or specify the social groups to whom success would apply. The majority of studies defined success in one dimension, most often demand-side provisioning (e.g., productivity or biodiversity). A regression analysis suggests that studies on rangelands or grasslands, correlative studies, and/or studies of state property systems (i.e., protected areas) were more likely to use fewer dimensions of success. Problem orientations often did not correlate with dimensions of success considered in a study, suggesting that measures of success often cannot adequately address the full suite of problems recognized in synthesis research. This presents a significant challenge for collective action among scholars who aim to develop general knowledge on SES and CPR governance. We discuss exemplary studies that measure success as multidimensional, address power and tradeoffs, and conclude with four recommendations for advancing the analysis of success.

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Rights‐based fisheries management (RBFM) seeks to create market incentives to reduce competition, avoid overexploitation, and increase economic efficiency. Particularly for artisanal fisheries, however, assumptions of RBFM may not be met and its use needs to be carefully considered. This study applies an existing tool (SEASALT) to evaluate the strength of RBFM based on attributes of security, exclusivity, fish mortality, scale, responsibility, limitations, and transferability. Results for 17 fisheries in Mexico show a positive (nonsignificant) relationship between the strength of RBFM and stock status, and no effect on prices or landed value. Real‐world fisheries governance systems are much more complex than the simple linkages between attributes implied in SEASALT, but results highlight pre‐existing monitoring and enforcement capacity as essential for successful RBFM. Transitions to RBFM may strengthen this capacity, but likely cannot create it where it does not already exist. Based on our findings, RBFM strategies may benefit from group quotas with limited transferability to avoid negative social outcomes from consolidation or rent capture by intermediaries; this could potentially build on the latent capacity of traditional community associations common in many artisanal fisheries.