Background Research in embodied artificial intelligence (AI) has increasing clinical relevance for therapeutic applications in mental health services. With innovations ranging from ‘virtual psychotherapists’ to social robots in dementia care and autism disorder, to robots for sexual disorders, artificially intelligent virtual and robotic agents are increasingly taking on high-level therapeutic interventions that used to be offered exclusively by highly trained, skilled health professionals. In order to enable responsible clinical implementation, ethical and social implications of the increasing use of embodied AI in mental health need to be identified and addressed. Objective This paper assesses the ethical and social implications of translating embodied AI applications into mental health care across the fields of Psychiatry, Psychology and Psychotherapy. Building on this analysis, it develops a set of preliminary recommendations on how to address ethical and social challenges in current and future applications of embodied AI. Methods Based on a thematic literature search and established principles of medical ethics, an analysis of the ethical and social aspects of currently embodied AI applications was conducted across the fields of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Psychotherapy. To enable a comprehensive evaluation, the analysis was structured around the following three steps: assessment of potential benefits; analysis of overarching ethical issues and concerns; discussion of specific ethical and social issues of the interventions. Results From an ethical perspective, important benefits of embodied AI applications in mental health include new modes of treatment, opportunities to engage hard-to-reach populations, better patient response, and freeing up time for physicians. Overarching ethical issues and concerns include: harm prevention and various questions of data ethics; a lack of guidance on development of AI applications, their clinical integration and training of health professionals; ‘gaps’ in ethical and regulatory frameworks; the potential for misuse including using the technologies to replace established services, thereby potentially exacerbating existing health inequalities. Specific challenges identified and discussed in the application of embodied AI include: matters of risk-assessment, referrals, and supervision; the need to respect and protect patient autonomy; the role of non-human therapy; transparency in the use of algorithms; and specific concerns regarding long-term effects of these applications on understandings of illness and the human condition. Conclusions We argue that embodied AI is a promising approach across the field of mental health; however, further research is needed to address the broader ethical and societal concerns of these technologies to negotiate best research and medical practices in innovative mental health care. We conclude by indicating areas o...

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In times of global economic and political crises, the notion of solidarity is gaining new currency. This book argues that a solidarity-based perspective can help us to find new ways to address pressing problems. Exemplified by three case studies from the field of biomedicine: databases for health and disease research, personalised healthcare, and organ donation, it explores how solidarity can make a difference in how we frame problems, and in the policy solutions that we can offer.

Whether it is fair to use personal responsibility of patients for their own health as a rationing criterion in healthcare is a controversial matter. A host of difficulties are associated with the concept of personal responsibility in the field of medicine. These include, in particular, theoretical considerations of justice and such practical issues as multiple causal factors in medicine and freedom of health behaviour. In the article, personal responsibility is evaluated from the perspective of several theories of justice. It is argued that in a healthcare system based on both equality of opportunity and solidarity, responsible health behaviour can -- in principle -- be justifiably expected. While the practical problems associated with personal responsibility are important, they do not warrant the common knee-jerk refusal to think more deeply about responsibility for health as a means of allocating healthcare resources. In conclusion, the possibility of introducing personal responsibility as a fair rationing criterion is briefly sketched.

This paper, which is based on an extensive analysis of the literature, gives a brief overview of the main ways in which solidarity has been employed in bioethical writings in the last two decades. As the vagueness of the term has been one of the main targets of critique, we propose a new approach to defining solidarity, identifying it primarily as a practice enacted at the interpersonal, communal, and contractual/legal levels. Our three-tier model of solidarity can also help to explain the way in which crises of solidarity can occur, notably when formal solidaristic arrangements continue to exist despite 'lower tiers' of solidarity practices at inter-personal and communal levels having 'broken away'. We hope that this contribution to the growing debate on the potential for the value of solidarity to help tackle issues in bioethics and beyond, will stimulate further discussion involving both conceptual and empirically informed perspectives.