Passwords are still a mainstay of various security systems, as well as the cause of many usability issues. For end-users, many of these issues have been studied extensively, highlighting problems and informing design decisions for better policies and motivating research into alternatives. However, end-users are not the only ones who have usability problems with passwords! Developers who are tasked with writing the code by which passwords are stored must do so securely. Yet history has shown that this complex task often fails due to human error with catastrophic results. While an end-user who selects a bad password can have dire consequences, the consequences of a developer who forgets to hash and salt a password database can lead to far larger problems. In this paper we present a first qualitative usability study with 20 computer science students to discover how developers deal with password storage and to inform research into aiding developers in the creation of secure password systems. * These authors contributed equally to this work.

Abstract-The computer security community has advocated widespread adoption of secure communication tools to counter mass surveillance. Several popular personal communication tools (e.g., WhatsApp, iMessage) have adopted end-to-end encryption, and many new tools (e.g., Signal, Telegram) have been launched with security as a key selling point. However it remains unclear if users understand what protection these tools offer, and if they value that protection. In this study, we interviewed 60 participants about their experience with different communication tools and their perceptions of the tools' security properties. We found that the adoption of secure communication tools is hindered by fragmented user bases and incompatible tools. Furthermore, the vast majority of participants did not understand the essential concept of end-to-end encryption, limiting their motivation to adopt secure tools. We identified a number of incorrect mental models that underpinned these beliefs.

With WhatsApp's adoption of the Signal Protocol as its default, end-to-end encryption by the masses happened almost overnight. Unlike iMessage, WhatsApp notifies users that encryption is enabled, explicitly informing users about improved privacy. This rare feature gives us an opportunity to study people's understandings and perceptions of secure messaging pre-and post-mass messenger encryption (pre/post-MME). To study changes in perceptions, we compared the results of two mental models studies: one conducted in 2015 pre-MME and one in 2017 post-MME. Our primary finding is that users do not trust encryption as currently offered. When asked about encryption in the study, most stated that they had heard of encryption, but only a few understood the implications, even on a high level. Their consensus view was that no technical solution to stop skilled attackers from getting their data exists. Even with a major development, such as WhatsApp rolling out endto-end encryption, people still do not feel well protected by their technology. Surprisingly, despite WhatsApp's end-to-end security info messages and the high media attention, the majority of the participants were not even aware of encryption. Most participants had an almost correct threat model, but don't believe that there is a technical solution to stop knowledgeable attackers to read their messages. Using technology made them feel vulnerable.

Recruiting professional programmers in sufficient numbers for research studies can be challenging because they often cannot spare the time, or due to their geographical distribution and potentially the cost involved. Online platforms such as Clickworker or Qualtrics do provide options to recruit participants with programming skill; however, misunderstandings and fraud can be an issue. This can result in participants without programming skill taking part in studies and surveys. If these participants are not detected, they can cause detrimental noise in the survey data. In this paper, we develop screener questions that are easy and quick to answer for people with programming skill but difficult to answer correctly for those without. In order to evaluate our questionnaire for efficacy and efficiency, we recruited several batches of participants with and without programming skill and tested the questions. In our batch 42% of Clickworkers stating that they have programming skill did not meet our criteria and we would recommend filtering these from studies. We also evaluated the questions in an adversarial setting. We conclude with a set of recommended questions which researchers can use to recruit participants with programming skill from online platforms.

In 2017 and 2018, Naiakshina et al. [21, 22] studied in a lab setting whether computer science students need to be told to write code that stores passwords securely. The authors' results showed that, without explicit prompting, none of the students implemented secure password storage. When asked about this oversight, a common answer was that they would have implemented secure storage-if they were creating code for a company. To shed light on this possible confusion, we conducted a mixed-methods field study with developers. We hired freelance developers online and gave them a similar password storage task followed by a questionnaire to gain additional insights into their work. From our research, we offer two contributions. First of all, we reveal that, similar to the students, freelancers do not store passwords securely unless prompted, they have misconceptions about secure password storage, and they use outdated methods. Secondly, we discuss the methodological implications of using freelancers and students in developer studies. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy; • Human-centered computing → Empirical studies in HCI .