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The paper analyses the effects of income concentration on the behaviour of a duopoly with vertical product differentiation and uncovered market. By using a trapezoid distribution, we solve explicitly for market equilibrium as a function of a mean preserving spread of the income distribution. We show that overall more concentrated incomes imply stronger product differentiation, as the presence of a large share of middle-income consumers stimulates a price competition, whose effects are dampened through an enlargement of the quality spread. While the high-quality advantage and market coverage increase unambiguously in the degree of income concentration, the behaviour of prices is non-monotone in the distribution parameter.

We consider the choice of price/quantity by a public and a private firm in a mixed differentiated duopoly. First, we study the way in which the strategic choice of the market variable is affected by different given organizational structures (managerial or entrepreneurial) of the public and the private firm. Second, we investigate how the price/quantity choice interacts with the endogenous choice of the organizational structure, thus determining a subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms choose to behave as price-setters and to adopt a managerial structure

Abstract. In this paper we study the role of market competitiveness in a strategic delegation game in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in the firm's relative performance. In particular we study how the optimal delegation scheme -i.e. the distortion from pure profit maximization -is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We show that these two indexes of market competitiveness do not alter managerial incentives in the same way: while the optimal degree of delegation decreases as the market becomes less concentrated, it increases as demand becomes more elastic.