Recently many European countries have incurred crises in public finance despite the fact that EU institutions have pushed the national governments toward the sustainability of public finance with compulsory and voluntary rules regarding fiscal governance. This paper investigates the relations between the quality of fiscal governance and the financial virtuosity of national fiscal policy. We proposed a general framework for analyzing the fiscal governance issue and we empirically tested the correlation between the dimensions of fiscal governance and the budgetary performance of EU countries. The results showed a positive correlation between the quality of fiscal governance in the EU countries and financial surplus in the period concerned. However further investigations are needed and an effort should be made to collect uniform data on fiscal governance in the European Union.

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to assess the differential impact on the stock market of statements made by and information about directors and companies who are politically connected, compared to directors and companies with no political connections. The authors also analyze the role played by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which the authors have identified as politically connected companies because most board members are appointed by political authorities. Furthermore, the boundaries and institutional environment within which SOEs operate are likely to be different from private companies.Design/methodology/approachThe sample is composed of over 60,000 news articles on the boards of directors (both with political roles and without political roles) of listed Italian companies in the period 1998–2013. On that sample the authors run a regression analysis under the signaling theory approach.FindingsResults suggest a positive effect on market capitalization associated with individual political connections. This effect decreases when the political connection extends to the whole enterprise although it still remains, while a negative effect is associated with state-controlled enterprises. The impact of negative news content does not change depending on whether a board member has a political role or not.Originality/valuePrevious research has demonstrated a causal link between stock prices and their reaction to corporate news (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Peress, 2014), but no studies have quantified the different reactions that occur when the news mentions politically connected companies and individuals who hold a political role.

This paper investigates the investor reaction to audit reports containing a going concern modification (GCM) in the Italian market following new amendments regarding auditing regulations and public financial information disclosures. We applied the event study (ES) methodology to short event windows considering Italian listed companies during the period 2009–2015. Our findings partially contradict previous studies revealing a systematic negative impact of GCMs, especially when a GCM is attached to unqualified opinions. We clearly observe that Italian auditors have a strong higher propensity to issue a GCM than to express a qualification. Moreover, we find other interesting results that contradict the mainstream literature, detecting a stronger negative reaction in the case of recurring GCMs and when the modification is issued by non-Big 4 auditing firms. These differences could be explained considering the environmental characteristics of the Italian market such as the ownership structure, governance mechanisms and accounting culture, where minority investors act against ownership in accordance with the type II agency problem. Our empirical results suggest that the domestic and international regulatory amendments during the study period have increased the value relevance of GCMs and the usefulness of financial disclosures. This study might be of interest to practitioners and regulators in regard to contributing to the introduction of further regulatory interventions that will enhance both the informativeness of audit reports and awareness of investors in regard to going concern uncertainty.

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