In this paper, we propose the adoption of moral philosophy and in particular normative ethics, to clarify the concept of “good” evaluation of “research practices”. Using MacIntyre (1985)’s notion of a practice we argue that research is a form of social practice. As a result of this characterization, we claim that research practice typically requires three typologies of researcher: the leader, the good researcher and the honest researcher. Reflecting on what is a “good” research practice and on what is the role of researchers in it provides insight into some aspects of both the self-assessment process and how this promotes individual improvement. Moreover, this kind of reflection helps us to describe the functions (missions) of the research practices. A “good” evaluation should take into account all the building constituents of a “good” research practice and should be able to discriminate between good and bad research practices, while enforcing the functions of good research practices. We believe that these reflections may be the starting point for a paradigm shift in the evaluation of research practices which replaces an evaluation centred on products with an evaluation focused on the functions of these practices. In the last sections of the paper, we introduce and discuss an important aspect for the implementation of the proposed framework. This relates to the assessment of the virtues of researchers involved in a good research practice. Some examples of questions and preliminary items to include in a questionnaire for the assessment of Virtues in Research Practices are also provided.

The present article reviews the state of public debate and legal provisions concerning end‐of‐life decision‐making in Italy and offers an evaluation of the moral and legal issues involved. The article further examines the content of a recent law concerning informed consent and advance treatment directives, the main court pronouncements that formed the basis for the law, and developments in the public debate and important jurisprudential acts subsequent to its approval. The moral and legal grounds for a positive evaluation of this law, which attests that the patient may withhold or withdraw from life‐prolonging treatment, will be offered with reference to liberal approaches and particularly to the frameworks of care and virtue ethics; but reasons will also be offered in order to consider not only the latter but also broader range of end‐of‐life treatment decisions as morally apt options. In this light, we argue in favour of a further development of the Italian legislation to encompass forms of assisted suicide and active euthanasia.

In this paper we answer the question of how evaluation should be by proposing a good evaluation of research practices. A good evaluation of research practices, intended as social practices à la MacIntyre, should take into account the stable motivations and the traits of the characters (i.e. the virtues) of researchers. We also show that a good evaluation is also just, beyond the sense of fairness, as working on good research practices implies keep into account a broader sense of justice. After that, we propose the development of a knowledge base for the assessment of “good” evaluations of research practices to implement a questionnaire for the assessment of researchers’ virtues. Although the latter is a challenging task, the use of ontologies and taxonomic knowledge, and the reasoning algorithms that can draw inferences on the basis of such knowledge represents a way for testing the consistency of the information reported in the questionnaire and to analyse correctly and coherently how the data is gathered through it. Finally, we describe the potential application usefulness of our proposal for the reform of current research assessment systems.

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