Philosophers and historians of science have for some time now debated whether the results of current science are 'contingent' or 'inevitable'. Scholars have noted that inevitabilism often enjoys the status of a presumptive default position. Consequently, contingentists are, from the outset, lumbered with the burden of proof. This is evident in the case of the inevitabilist demand that the contingentist "put up or shut up" (PUSU). This paper adds to the existing case which says that inevitabilism's default-status is unjustified. However, whilst some have suggested that contingentism should replace inevitabilism as the default position, I argue that the contingency/inevitability (C/I) conversation should proceed sans default. This move is motivated largely by my claim that the C/I issue is best conceived as a 'local', rather than a global or universal one. The main problem with taking inevitabilism or contingentism as the default is the globalist nature of such a tack. Whilst localism is arguably an emergent reality of the growing C/I literature, its implications have not been fully realised. I suggest that fully and explicitly embracing localism, including the closely related move of doing away with defaults, represents the most promising way forward for the C/I conversation. In addition, I will show how these moves entail that we stop worrying about the inevitabilist PUSU demand, or more bluntly, that we shut up about putting-up. Keywords contingentism; inevitabilism; "put up or shut up"; defaultism; globalism; localism Joseph Martin's (2013) article, which purports to address a "lingering ambiguity in the way contingency is defined" (919), is one such contribution. In it, Martin proposes a taxonomy of contingency claims, organised according to "the things within science considered to be

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