Officials worldwide have sought ways to effectively use mobile technology to communicate health information to help thwart the spread of Covid‐19. This study offers a preliminary exploration of whether state‐level ( N = 6) and local‐level ( N = 53) wireless emergency alert (WEA) messages might contribute to impeding the spread of Covid‐19 in the United States. The study compares changes in reported rates of infections and deaths between states and localities that issued WEA messages in March and April of 2020 with states that did not. Small sample sizes and differences in the rates of Covid‐19 spread prohibit robust statistical analysis and detection of clear effect sizes, but estimated effects are generally in the right direction. Combining statistical analysis with preliminary categorization of both WEA message content and social media themes suggests that a positive effect from WEA messages cannot be ruled out.

This study offers a preliminary exploration of whether state-level (N=6) and local-level (N=53) Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) messages might contribute to impeding the spread of Covid-19 in the United States. The study compares changes in reported rates of infections and deaths between states and localities that issued WEA messages in March and April of 2020 with states that did not. Small sample sizes and differences in the rates of Covid-19 spread prohibit robust statistical analysis and detection of clear effect sizes, but estimated effects are generally in the right direction.

US and international officials have sought ways to effectively use mobile technology to communicate health information to help thwart the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). This study offers a preliminary exploration into the use of the state-level (N ¼ 6) and local-level (N ¼ 53) Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) for notifications regarding COVID-19 in the US. The study compares changes in reported rates of infections and deaths between states and localities that issued WEA messages in March and April of 2020 with states that did not. Small sample sizes and differences in the rates of COVID-19 spread prohibit robust statistical analysis and detection of clear effect sizes, but estimated effects are generally in the right direction. Combining statistical analysis with preliminary categorization of both WEA message content and social media themes suggests that WEA messages might play an important role in instructing people to take protective in response to COVID-19. These initial lines of inquiry will be further developed in subsequent research.

Russian disinformation activities imitate divisive U.S. political discourse within a polarized social media ecosystem. As part of a multipronged response, U.S. citizens have been urged to increase their personal vigilance and to identify inauthentic messages, hence flagging foreign-made disinformation by studying its content. However, by applying Taylor's concept of “imitation (in)security” to a set of Kremlin-linked Internet Research Agency (IRA) Facebook and Instagram advertisements, this article explains why content-centered approaches to combatting disinformation need to be reimagined. Building upon imitation (in)security, we propose that the strength of the IRA disinformation campaign was not its ability to foist falsehoods upon unsuspecting Americans, but, rather, its uncanny imitation of prevalent themes, images, and arguments within American civic life. Our analysis of IRA-generated advertisements targeting U.S. military veterans demonstrates how IRA “trolls” were imitating American communication patterns to amplify existing positions within a deluge of messages marked by polysemy. Our analysis suggests readers should be less concerned by such Russian-made imitations than was suggested in much of the breathless 2016 post-election coverage, for the traction of such disinformation hinges on domestic crises and injustices that long predate Russian interference. Pointing to foreign-made social media content stokes a sense of threat and crisis—the essence of national insecurity and a main objective of the IRA's efforts—yet our actual security weaknesses are homemade.