This note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability, presented by Bester and Güth (1998), applies under more general preference and payoff functions.JEL Classification: C72; A13

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I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases: Evolution, Aggregate-taking, Aggregative games., JEL Classification Numbers: C72.,

This paper provides su¢ cient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by …nite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Evolutionary stability, Finite populations JEL Codes: C72, C73 AbstractThis paper provides su¢ cient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by …nite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.