The breakdown of the financial markets in fall 2007 and the following debt crisis in the EU has produced an enormous mistrust in financial products and the monetary system. The paper describes the background of the crisis induced by functional failures in risk management and the multifold principal agent problems existing in the financial market structures. The innovated nontransparent financial products have mixed up different risk weights and puzzled, or even fooled formerly loyal customers. Contemporaneously abundant liquidity on the international financial market accompanied by easy money policies of the Fed in the US and the ECB in the euro zone have depressed the real interest rate to zero or even negative values. Desperate investors are seeking for safe-assets, but their demand remains unsatisfied. Low real interest rates and the consequently lacking compound interest effect in the same time jeopardize private as well as public insurance schemes being dependent on capital funding: the demographic crisis becomes gloomy. Therefore, the managers of the financial markets have to reestablish CSR and to divide the markets into safe-asset areas for the usual clients and “casino” areas for those who like to play with high risks. Only with transparency and risk adequate financial products can the lost commitment be regained.

The breakdown of the financial markets in fall 2007 and the following debt crisis in the EU have produced an enormous mistrust in financial products and the monetary system. The paper describes the background of the crisis induced by functional failures in risk management and the multifold principal agent problems existing in the financial market structures. The innovated nontransparent financial products especially by the so-called shadow banks have mixed up differential risk weights and puzzled or even fooled formerly loyal customers. Contemporaneously abundant liquidity on the international financial market accompanied by easy money policies of the Fed in the US and the ECB in the euro zone have depressed the real interest rate to zero or even negative values. Desperate investors are seeking for safe-assets but their demand remains unsatisfied. Low real interest rates and the consequently lacking compound interest effect in the same time jeopardize private as well as public insurance schemes being dependent on capital funding: the demographic crisis becomes gloomy. Therefore, the managers of the financial markets have to reestablish CSR and to separate the markets into safe-asset areas for the usual clients and "casino" areas for those who like to play with high risks. Only with transparency and risk adequate financial products the lost commitment can be regained.

The breakdown of the financial markets in 2007 and the ensuing debt crisis in the EU has produced enormous mistrust in financial products and the monetary system. The emergence of shadow banking also changed the behavior patterns of management so that its self-interest dominated the interests of shareholders and the other stakeholders. These false incentives led to merger processes in the financial system resulting in market structures in which single institutions became too big or too connected to fail. The empirical developments and the political counter-measures described in this article point to the fact that the macroperspective has been dominant, neglecting individual irresponsibility and failure.Key words: capital funding, corporate social responsibility, financial markets, principal agent problems, risk management resumen La caída de los mercados financieros en 2007 y la subsecuente crisis de la deuda en Estados Unidos produjeron una enorme desconfianza en los productos financieros y en el sistema monetario. El surgimiento del sector bancario en la sombra (shadow banking), también ha cambiado los patrones de conducta de la administración, de manera tal que los intereses de esta última dominaron los de los accionistas y otros tenedores de acciones. Estos falsos incentivos llevaron a fusionar procesos en el sistema financiero que tuvieron como resultado el surgimiento de estructuras mercantiles por medio de las cuales cada institución por separado se hizo demasiado grande o demasiado cercana al fracaso. Los desarrollos empíricos y las contramedidas polí-ticas descritos en este artículo apuntan hacia el hecho de que ha dominado la perspectiva macro, lo que de algún modo niega la irresponsabilidad y el fracaso individuales.Palabras clave: Fondeo de capital, responsabilidad social corporativa, mercados financieros, problemas del agente principal, administración de riesgos

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