Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross-subsidization mechanisms like revenue-sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue sharing. It shows that the effect on club profits, player salaries, and competitive balance crucially depends on the mix of these policy tools. Moreover, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian-conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with either a salary cap or a salary floor.

This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and studies the welfare effect of salary caps. It shows that salary caps will increase competitive balance and decrease overall salary payments within the league. The resulting effect on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the preference of fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds only for large-market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.

Applying stochastic frontier analysis, we estimate the importance of sports in society as technical efficiency of countries in the production of Olympic success since the 1950s. Our measures of success are medal shares and a broader concept including Olympic diplomas. Following Bernard and Busse (2004), population and GDP are used as inputs. While the impact of GDP is always positive, we show that the sign of the population effect depends on wealth and population size of a country.The results show that the spread of importance is very wide over time, across countries, gender, and sports. These differences can be seen as caused by differences in financial support, training methods, organization, or culture. Using the method proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), we confirm the result well documented in the literature that planned economies and host countries are more successful than others in terms of Olympic success (e.g. Bernard and Busse, 2004). The method allows to shed light on important aspects of recent sport history, such as the consequences of the breakdown of the former Soviet Union.

This paper analyzes the effects of a percentage-of-revenue salary cap in a team sports league with win-maximizing clubs and flexible talent supply. It shows that a percentage-of-revenue cap produces a more balanced league and decreases aggregate salary payments. Taking into account the idiosyncrasies of European football, our paper further highlights the potential conflicts between the league and society. From the perspective of a league governing body, a percentage-of-revenue cap always enhances financial stability of win-maximizing clubs. A social planner, however, will not permit the introduction of such a cap if fans and players unduly suffer. This paper shows under which conditions the social planner accepts (rejects) a salary cap proposed by the league regulator. (JEL D02, D60, L83) * We would like to thank Joan-Ramon Borrell Arque,

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