BackgroundSince 2003, Asia-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia, has received substantial attention because of the anticipation that it could be the epicentre of the next pandemic. There has been active investment but earlier review of pandemic preparedness plans in the region reveals that the translation of these strategic plans into operational plans is still lacking in some countries particularly those with low resources. The objective of this study is to understand the pandemic preparedness programmes, the health systems context, and challenges and constraints specific to the six Asian countries namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Taiwan, Thailand, and Viet Nam in the prepandemic phase before the start of H1N1/2009.MethodsThe study relied on the Systemic Rapid Assessment (SYSRA) toolkit, which evaluates priority disease programmes by taking into account the programmes, the general health system, and the wider socio-cultural and political context. The components under review were: external context; stewardship and organisational arrangements; financing, resource generation and allocation; healthcare provision; and information systems. Qualitative and quantitative data were collected in the second half of 2008 based on a review of published data and interviews with key informants, exploring past and current patterns of health programme and pandemic response.ResultsThe study shows that health systems in the six countries varied in regard to the epidemiological context, health care financing, and health service provision patterns. For pandemic preparation, all six countries have developed national governance on pandemic preparedness as well as national pandemic influenza preparedness plans and Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) response plans. However, the governance arrangements and the nature of the plans differed. In the five developing countries, the focus was on surveillance and rapid containment of poultry related transmission while preparation for later pandemic stages was limited. The interfaces and linkages between health system contexts and pandemic preparedness programmes in these countries were explored.ConclusionHealth system context influences how the six countries have been preparing themselves for a pandemic. At the same time, investment in pandemic preparation in the six Asian countries has contributed to improvement in health system surveillance, laboratory capacity, monitoring and evaluation and public communications. A number of suggestions for improvement were presented to strengthen the pandemic preparation and mitigation as well as to overcome some of the underlying health system constraints.

This case study on Vietnam aims to generate empirical evidence on the relative merits of integration of two priority health interventions, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), into six functions of the wider health system: stewardship and governance, service delivery, demand generation, monitoring and evaluation, planning, and financing. Selective documentary reviews and 25 qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted in early 2009 in Hanoi, Hai Duong province, Chih Linh district and Hoang Tien commune with informants from international, national and sub-national agencies steering or managing the HIV/AIDS and TB programmes and from health facilities providing HIV/AIDS and TB services. Data collected were collated and evaluated against 25 elements of integration. Each element of integration was ultimately classified as being 'fully/predominantly integrated', 'partially integrated', 'not or predominantly not integrated'. The results showed that none of the six programme functions was fully integrated into the general health care system as a whole. They were established either in parallel, notably at higher administrative levels, or were partially integrated. The study findings also revealed that little integration across all functional levels has occurred between the two programmes. Generally international agencies and sub-national domestic stakeholders supported more integration between vertical programmes (HIV and TB) and the general health systems, while national bodies responsible for HIV and TB favoured reinforcing a more vertical and thus less integrated approach. In the absence of shared assumptions and goals, this polarization of views may result in sub-optimal effectiveness and efficiency of each of the disease programmes as well as of HIV/TB interventions.

BackgroundWith the emergence of influenza H1N1v the world is facing its first 21st century global pandemic. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza H5N1 prompted development of pandemic preparedness plans. National systems of public health law are essential for public health stewardship and for the implementation of public health policy[1]. International coherence will contribute to effective regional and global responses. However little research has been undertaken on how law works as a tool for disease control in Europe. With co-funding from the European Union, we investigated the extent to which laws across Europe support or constrain pandemic preparedness planning, and whether national differences are likely to constrain control efforts.MethodsWe undertook a survey of national public health laws across 32 European states using a questionnaire designed around a disease scenario based on pandemic influenza. Questionnaire results were reviewed in workshops, analysing how differences between national laws might support or hinder regional responses to pandemic influenza. Respondents examined the impact of national laws on the movements of information, goods, services and people across borders in a time of pandemic, the capacity for surveillance, case detection, case management and community control, the deployment of strategies of prevention, containment, mitigation and recovery and the identification of commonalities and disconnects across states.ResultsResults of this study show differences across Europe in the extent to which national pandemic policy and pandemic plans have been integrated with public health laws. We found significant differences in legislation and in the legitimacy of strategic plans. States differ in the range and the nature of intervention measures authorized by law, the extent to which borders could be closed to movement of persons and goods during a pandemic, and access to healthcare of non-resident persons. Some states propose use of emergency powers that might potentially override human rights protections while other states propose to limit interventions to those authorized by public health laws.ConclusionThese differences could create problems for European strategies if an evolving influenza pandemic results in more serious public health challenges or, indeed, if a novel disease other than influenza emerges with pandemic potential. There is insufficient understanding across Europe of the role and importance of law in pandemic planning. States need to build capacity in public health law to support disease prevention and control policies. Our research suggests that states would welcome further guidance from the EU on management of a pandemic, and guidance to assist in greater commonality of legal approaches across states.

This article provides a critical portrait of the current state of public health policies and laws governing pandemic influenza prevention and control in Europe. It examines the role of and relationship between national public health policy and national communicable disease legislation as tools for the prevention and control of pandemic influenza, the role of Europe in pandemic disease preparedness, and the concept of harmonization across European states, including an overview of supranational initiatives and powers created to enhance harmonization of national pandemic disease policy. Short case studies epitomize important concerns around harmonization in Europe. The article considers opportunities and impediments to further harmonization. Particular attention is paid to the essential role of law as a tool to underpin and implement preparedness policies and to protect individual rights against unjustified state intervention.

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