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N ew challenges are reshaping the international order, requiring government leaders to consider new strategies and tools that integrate diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power. Nowhere is this more evident than around the Mediterranean Sea, which has progressively returned as a region of global strategic interest where political tensions, armed conflict, economic and social instability and transnational criminal networks demand solutions that cross traditional institutional boundaries of domestic and international policymaking. The geo-political situation on the southern coast of the Mediterranean has radically changed and new challenges have emerged for the European Union, United States, and beyond. Long-lasting issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or the tensions between Turkey and Greece, continue to be present, but new destabilising factors have emerged in the region following the Arab Spring of 2011. The US, EU and NATO continue to maintain a significant military presence in and around the Mediterranean, but military capabilities must be nested within a whole-of-government, international approach. The challenges in this region demand unprecedented levels of civil-military and intergovernmental cooperation. In this context, RAND established the Mediterranean Foresight Forum (MFF) in 2015 to support the development of comprehensive, integrated civil-military responses to complex regional challenges through an innovative combination of research, scenariobased sensitivity analysis and strategic-level exercises. This publication is part of a series of four RAND Perspectives (PE) each focusing on different challenges in the Mediterranean region. This PE focuses on Defence and Security. Other PE focus on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Criminal Activities and Crosscutting issues. Key findings and observations • Many of the defence and security challenges that exist in the region are multi-faceted, long-standing and ingrained. It is not clear that actors possess the individual or collective will and economic resources needed to support a comprehensive approach to regional conflict. • Given finite political and economic capital, the question arises whether the priority should be reinforcing relative success (e.g. Tunisia) or tackling the worst problems (e.g. Syria, Libya). • The actions of external players in the countries of the Mediterranean region, particularly Russia and the US, represent a significant complicating and potentially escalatory factor. • Destroying Islamic State in one country while others remain fragile and violent is likely to see the problem relocate, rather than disappear.

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