Romantic love has been conceptualised as an emotional resource that promotes consumerism, by deeply affecting the creation of the modern self (Illouz, 2012). Simultaneously, both research and media discourses present the modern ‘good’ father’s role as one of enhanced intimacy (Dermott, 2008), and one in which fathers’ experiences of paternal love are routinely overlooked. I argue that paternal love as a different form of love than romantic love can resist commodification to a certain extent. Based on data from 47 qualitative interviews with Scottish and Romanian fathers, I argue that involved fathers have an ambivalent relationship to consumerism. Far from uniformly adopting it, data reveal that fathers resist it by focusing on the emotional value of gifts and developing their children’s warmth and confidence (încredere in sine).1 This happens in a social context where fathers shift emotionally between love and stoicism as they flexibly adopt either an intimate or provider role according to different contexts. Exploring paternal love is important in understanding how fathers, in relation to their children, not only participate but can also resist the commodification of their intimate lives, and can contest the general discourse of the commodification of love.

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' (2011) influential concept of 'doing family' not only 'having a family', has yet to be applied to the emotional dynamics inherent in the cultural shaping of fatherhood. Drawing from two case studies, of a Scottish and a Romanian father, I reflect in this chapter on the interconnections between 'doing family' and 'loving', as types of relational and emotional activities which maintain family bonds across borders despite intimate separations (divorce) and work migration. These case studies are taken from a qualitative research project exploring 47 fathers' experiences of involvement and love in their family lives. The specific case studies of Sergiu and Keith, marked by emotional trade-offs and relational give-and-takes in different spaces, illuminate the contradictions of their involvement in their close relationships to their children and expartners. For these two fathers, the process of 'doing family' after separations was a disjointed and renegotiated one, involving the use of emotional reflexivity, developed because of their changing lifecircumstances. In this process, both fathers recount how they began reconfiguring their masculine identity from providing to establishing intimate fathering (Dermott, 2008). These changes occurred when their normative precepts of family life were transformed in situations of emotional upheaval, movement and relocation. As their families were in motion, fathers mentioned instances of changing their communication strategies to express love in more visible ways to their children, directly constructing their 'good fathering' identity (Henwood and Procter, 2003) from renewed positions. Family separations in this context offered the potential to challenge the traditional father's role.

Theoretically, the term “doing gender” first appeared in Harold Garfinkel’s case study of the intersexual Agnes in 1967, as an appendix to Garfinkel 1967 (cited under General Overview). The term was then discussed in Kessler and McKenna 1978 (cited under General Overview). The authors drew from Erving Goffman’s social constructionist theory of performance in establishing, first, the difference between sex and gender, and second, how gender was something people actively constructed in their daily lives. The provocation was therefore that if people were responsible for “doing” gender then they could also be held accountable for “undoing” gender. The book, however, was obscured by the proliferation of research regarding sex roles, rather than gender constructions. So, the concept of “doing gender” remained underground for a while, until it resurfaced in 1987 in the well-known paper of the same name written by American sociologists Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman (West and Zimmerman 1987, cited under General Overview). According to these authors, “doing” gender is defined as involving the everyday performance of “a complex of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine ‘natures.’ When we view gender as an accomplishment, an achieved property of situated conduct, our attention shifts from matters internal to the individual and focuses on interactional and, ultimately, institutional arenas” (p. 126). West and Zimmerman were primarily focused on understanding how people created gender differences, rather than merely “gender.” Unlike Kessler and McKenna, who discussed the applicability of doing gender in transsexualism, West and Zimmerman finely combed the differences between “sex,” “sex category,” and “gender.” Following on from this, Deutsch 2007 together with Connell 2010 (both cited under Critiques of Doing Gender) critiqued this concept and proposed the “redoing of gender.” For example, Connell’s research uncovered that for transpeople, doing gender entailed “experiences that fit better under either the rubric of undoing gender or of redoing gender,” that transpeople “often attempted to meld together masculine and feminine gender performances” (p. 39), and that “many resisted these pressures by adapting a hybrid gender style of interacting with others. These acts constitute moments of ‘chipping away’ at the established gender order” (pp. 42–43). In addition, Judith Butler (see Butler 2004, cited under Critiques of Doing Gender) was more interested in exploring how gender could be undone, and defines this undoing as escaping “gender as a kind of a doing, an incessant activity performed . . . an improvisation within a scene of constraint” (p. 3) by underlining the “paradox of autonomy, a paradox that is heightened when gender regulations work to paralyze gendered agency at various levels” (p. 101). From this perspective, there are limits to how much agency individuals can have in performing gender. As such and inadvertently, social actors also undo gender when they relate to each other: “Despite one’s best efforts, one is undone, in the face of the other, by the touch, by the scent, by the feel, by the prospect of the touch, by the memory of the feel. And so, when we speak about my sexuality or my gender, as we do (and as we must) we mean something complicated by it” (p. 19). Butler’s focus on embodiment definitively pushed the debate further by critically assessing the usefulness of considering gender as an activity and asking sociologists to consider the ontological implication of the performativity of gender in relation to its mere performance. Her work is important because it clearly underlined the neglect of feminist studies to focus more on transgender identities, thereby sparking the growth of a specific area of knowledge known today as “queer theory.” In response to these developments, “doing gender” was further developed by West and Zimmerman 2009 (cited under General Overview), a celebratory symposium published twenty-two years after West and Zimmerman 1987 to assess the more recent applicability of this term in the field of gender studies. Methodologically, searching for resources on the theme of “doing gender” has focused on the performance of gender and on the domains of research to which it has been applied so far, as indicated by the specific headings in this article, while considering as well the “undoing of gender” and its performativity. Not all experts in the field would agree with this organization. However, it is important to specify the many ways in which the influential concept has branched out and deeply affected the field of gender studies. Therefore, the reader will notice a running consideration in the papers selected for this entry, with both the doing and the undoing of gender across a variety of areas: in education and at work, across cultures and intersectionally, in relation to emotions and in personal life (where a distinction was made again between parenting and romantic coupling and partnership), for youth health, and beyond the binary. This way of organizing the material falls in line with the most recent developments in the field. A simple search on the Web of Science database of the words “doing gender” within the publications category and in the topics of “Sociology” and “Women’s studies” between 1987 (when West and Zimmerman first published their paper) and 2019 reveals a total of 866 resources. Therefore, as not all resources could be included, the ones that appear in this entry were selected based on relevance, recency of publication, number of citations, prominence in the field, and methodological innovation (such as doing gender in visual sociology, or anthologies that focus on diverse cultural examples). The scope was meant to be relevant, versatile, approachable, and useful to teachers, researchers, and interested students. Nonetheless, there is the limitation that only English-language resources are included. The General Overview section is focused on the development of the term “doing gender” in theory and research, including the original paper discussed in this section and others published in a symposium, while the section on Critiques of Doing Gender presents a series on ongoing critiques to the concept of “doing gender.”

Michel Foucault (1977) presented social theorists with a consideration of power as existing everywhere. Furthermore, Jonathan Heaney (2013) recently asserted that emotions and power should be considered conceptual counterparts. In this chapter, I propose that what Foucault considered the omnipresence of power refers to its deeply social connection to emotions as they are experienced in certain locations. To exemplify, I present an analysis of the trial of Oscar Pistorius as it took place in the High Court of Pretoria. His example is significant as it offers the space to link conceptually romantic love to power, as the famous athlete attempts to recreate his sense of exemplary masculinity through the performance of the repentant lover role, in relation to the courtroom as a discourse of power, enhanced by digital surveillance. The analysis plays on two levels: a) firstly, through his courtroom interactions with the judge, and b) through manipulating the public gaze to his advantage. As such, the televised South African courtroom becomes a space for the portrayal of a power-suffused masculine identity, which is flexibly reconstituted through emotional control and emotional release; in relation to this, the courtroom's design serves as a space for the accused's emotional containment. Lastly, my own self-reflexive involvement in the analysis of the trial contributes to a distinct experience of surveying his performance, reversing the gendered gaze and othering the male self.