A desired property of secure programs is control flow integrity (CFI): an attacker must not be able to alter how instructions are chained as specified in the program. Numerous techniques try to achieve this property with various trade-offs. But to achieve fine-grained CFI, one is required to extract a precise control flow graph (CFG), describing how instructions are chained together. Unfortunately it is not achievable in general. In this paper, we propose a way to overcome this impossibility result by restricting the instruction set architecture (ISA) semantics. We show that forbidding indirect jumps unlocks a precise CFG extraction for all acceptable programs. We discuss the implications and limitations of the new semantics and argue for the adoption of restricted ISAs for security-related computation.

No abstract

The computer network world is changing and the NetDevOps approach has brought the dynamics of applications and systems into the field of communication infrastructure. Businesses are changing and businesses are faced with difficulties related to the diversity of hardware and software that make up those infrastructures. The "Intent-Based Networking - Concepts and Definitions" document describes the different parts of the ecosystem that could be involved in NetDevOps. The recognize, generate intent, translate and refine features need a new way to implement algorithms. This is where artificial intelligence comes in.