This paper examines the emergence and transformation of pro-state paramilitarism at Aleppo University in Syria in the context of the uprising and civil war. Paramilitarism refers to clandestine, irregular armed organizations that carry out illegal acts of violence against clearly defined civilian individuals or groups. From the outbreak of the uprising in March 2011, the Assad regime' s violent response to the mass protests across the country became more extensive and intensive. The key aspect of the Assad regime' s repression against the population was its use of paramilitary forces, especially through the arming and mobilizing of ordinary Syrians in civil militias. Consequently, state-sponsored militias appeared in cities and towns across Syria to fill the gap and create a hub for recruitment, such as the Baath Party Battalions, in Aleppo in early 2012. One of the first tasks of these paramilitary groups was to identify activists and pass information on them to intelligence services. While they seem to have appeared out of the blue, they had a clear prehistory: these groups were rooted in existing civil society networks. How were these networks embedded in the Syrian state prior to the conflict? How and why were they recruited in 2011?

Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theorists have paid attention to either the structural factors or to the agential ones while studying social movements. Through the nexus of structure and agency this article explains the collective action of the students of Aleppo University between 2011 and 2013 as one episode of the Syrian Revolution. I argue that structures alone are not enough to facilitate collective action. It is the agency of the social movement participants that mend the structures to open more opportunities. Through applying Tilly and Tarrow's properties of a regime to the Syrian case I explore the opportunities that the challengers took to advance their claims to sustain their movement for three years. I argue, however, that the properties of the Syrian regime were not equally significant. By capitalising on their agency, I highlight the everyday micro practices of the students in challenging the regimes inside the campus. Finally, I look at the prominence of some properties over others and empirically show how these regime properties eventually led to the end of the movement inside the campus in 2013.

This chapter addresses the use of starvation as a weapon of war during the war in Syria including the possible goals and methods of the perpetrators, the outcomes for the victims, as well as the question of accountability. To provide a scope of the use of starvation during the war, as a tactic deployed by a variety of actors and across different geographies, this chapter includes four case studies: eastern Ghouta (in the Damascus suburbs), Aleppo, Deir Alzor, and starvation in detention. It draws on the authors’ interviews, previous research, and professional experience as humanitarian relief workers during the armed conflict in Syria, and an extensive review of media, human rights, and humanitarian reporting on conditions in the country throughout the civil war.

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