In a node replication attack, an adversary creates replicas of captured sensor nodes in an attempt to control information that is reaching the base station or, more generally, compromise the functionality of the network. In this work, we develop fully distributed and completely decentralized schemes to detect and evict multiple imposters in mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSNs). The proposed schemes not only quarantine these malicious nodes but also withstand collusion against collaborating imposters trying to blacklist legitimate nodes of the network. Hence the completeness and soundness of the protocols are guaranteed. Our protocols are coupled with extensive mathematical and experimental results, proving the viability of our proposals, thus making them fit for realistic mobile sensor network deployments.

Many crucial dependable and secure services including atomic commitment, consensus and group membership, and middleware services (such as replica, communication and transaction services) use fault detectors. Through the use of fault detectors, the overlying service can be exempted from failure treatment and synchronization requirements. Fault detection is essential for proving that the services carried out are correct. In this paper, we first identify the necessary conditions to detect faults in a message passing system where multiple disjoint paths exist between each pair of endpoints. We then present the first fault detection protocol capable of detecting message meta-data modification in the presence of various message interferences in addition to other faults including omission faults, message replay and spurious messages using disjoint paths, where paths with faults are not known a priori. In addition, it authenticates message origins allowing Sybil attacks to be detected, identifies faulty paths, and classifies faults in the presence of multiple messages sent by various system processes. We establish the completeness and soundness properties of the proposed algorithm, i.e., it detects each considered fault and each detected fault is an actual fault, respectively. We also show that our algorithm does not yield a significant packet size and delay overheads. The algorithm shows the viability of the use of disjoint paths in fault detection.

No abstract

No abstract

Abstract. Consider a distributed system that delivers each message from a process to its destination if the message transmission does not experience any faults and only delivers those sent by a non -faulty system process. Such a system is referred to as a reliable message passing system. A reliable message passin g system requires a reliable channel, a communication channel between a pair of processes that always detects a fault in message transmission and each detected fault is an actual fault, to be implemented. In this paper, we first identify the necessary conditions to detect some restricted form of Byzantine Faults in a message passing system where n disjoint paths exist between each pair of endpoints. We consider Byzantine Faults (BF) whose e_ect is limited to the modification of a message metadata, omission faults, and message replay. We then present a protocol implementing a reliable channel in message passing systems in the presence of n -1 Byzantine Faults using n disjoint paths between each pair of communication endpoints where the paths with faults are not known apriori. T he proposed protocol detects Byzantine Faults, where each detected fault, an actual fault, authenticates message origins, identifies faulty paths and classifies faults in the presence of multiple messages sent by various system processes.