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Over recent decades, share ownership of listed companies has concentrated into the hands of large institutional investors, challenging the traditional agency theory view of corporate governance as a mechanism to resolve the separation of ownership and control. Alternative theories have emerged to explain the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, each with a slightly different view on the motivations of these powerful shareholders and the nature of their relationship with corporate management. These theories share a common thread -the concept of investor stewardship -yet each theory applies it differently. This paper explores whether institutional investors should act primarily as stewards of their investee companies (agency theory), stewards of beneficiaries' funds (agency capitalism), stewards of a market/economy (universal ownership) or stewards of society (stakeholder theory), and whether this varies internationally. Through an analysis of national stewardship codes, the paper determines which of these theoretical approaches are most strongly reflected in emerging stewardship policy across the world. It presents a typology of stewardship codes as a framework for understanding cross-country variation in investor stewardship policy. Stewardship codes influence the shareholder-manager relationship and can encourage integration of wider economic and societal concerns into corporate finance.

This paper draws on research into the corporate governance practices of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. Interviews were conducted with the directors and/or company secretaries of 19 SMEs. The aim of the research was to explore not only SME corporate governance structures and processes but how SMEs had chosen to implement the Principles and the reasons for their choices. The paper addresses the issue of whether the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations were appropriate for SMEs. It describes the SME responses to the requirements, how these differ from those of larger companies, and how these differences impact on small companies.

This paper explores the role of investor stewardship against a background of broader efforts to improve the sustainability of financial markets. Stewardship codes, encouraging institutional investors to act as long-term, responsible shareholders, comprise an emerging aspect of contemporary corporate governance frameworks with important implications for sustainable finance. They have the potential to promote the incorporation of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors into both financial and business decision-making. This paper examines the way in which 25 stewardship codes from across the world approach ESG integration and explores the possibilities for enhancing their impact on sustainability. It concludes that stewardship codes form an influential part of the overall network of regulatory instruments supporting sustainable finance. They help to secure transparency, accountability and a progressive interpretation of long-standing fiduciary duties that better balances the interests of all stakeholders.