The antecedents and consequences of pay dispersion are studied using theory that focuses on the social comparisons that occur among members of the CEO's top team. Results from a sample of large public firms indicate that when members of this elite group were similar on a variety of dimensions, and thus likely to compare their pay, the board allowed less dispersion. In addition, pay dispersion was negatively related to company performance, particularly when it exceeded what could be justified by characteristics of the industry, firm, or team. But the strength of that relationship depended on how uniformly members of the team would benefit from subsequent performance gains. Specifically, the negative effect was particularly strong in firms where major differences in compensation-that is, some executives were given significantly more stock options-combined with a volatile stock price to provide only a few team members with the opportunity to realize very large financial gains in the future. The study demonstrates that the social-psychological factors that affect comparisons among members of the CEO's top team impact the board's pay setting process, which in turn affects pay dispersion, and ultimately firm performance.

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We examined how proportions of individuals in standard and nonstandard work arrangements affected work group members' relationships with supervisors, social relations with coworkers, willingness to assist others, and intentions to leave their organization. Supporting Blalock's theory of majority-minority group relations, higher proportions of nonstandard workers were associated with less favorable attitudes toward supervisors and peers, increased turnover intentions, and decreased workrelated helping behaviors. The consequences of heterogeneity in employment arrangements were contingent on (1) workers' locations in their firm's mobility system, (2) type of nonstandard arrangements, and (3) the amount and type of contact between standard and nonstandard workers.

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