Major journals have sounded the call for social psychologists to do research on the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19). Such research is only as good as the measurements used. Across three studies (total n = 984), we developed a battery of social psychology-relevant questionnaires to measure COVID-19 phenomena: (1) Perceived Coronavirus Threat Questionnaire, (2) Governmental Response to Coronavirus Questionnaire, (3) Coronavirus Impacts Questionnaire, and (4) Coronavirus Experience Questionnaire. Exploratory (Study 1) and Confirmatory (Studies 2 and 3) Factor Analyses revealed excellent factor structures for the one-factor Perceived Coronavirus Threat, the six-factor Governmental Response Questionnaires, and the three-factor Coronavirus Impacts Questionnaire. The three-factor Coronavirus Experience Questionnaire yielded poorer psychometric properties overall. Given that brevity is often desired for online studies, we further recommend psychometrically sound short versions of each questionnaire. Taken in total, this work offers social psychology researchers a battery of questionnaires to measure Coronavirus-related phenomena for the duration of the pandemic in U.S. participants.

Given research revealing conservatives are more sensitive to disease threat, it is curious that U.S. conservatives were less concerned than liberals with the COVID-19 pandemic. Across four studies that spanned almost ten months throughout the pandemic, we evaluated three potential reasons why conservatives were less concerned: (1) Motivated Political reasons (conservatives held COVID-specific political beliefs that motivated them to reduce concern), (2) Experiential reasons (conservatives were less directly affected by the outbreak than liberals), and (3) Conservative Messaging reasons (differential exposure to/trust in partisan conservative messaging). All four studies consistently showed evidence that political (and not experiential or partisan messaging) reasons more strongly mediated conservatives' lack of concern for COVID-19. Additional analyses further suggested that while they did not serve as strong mediators, experiential factors provided a boundary condition for the conservatism➔perceived threat relationship. These data on over 3000 participants are consistent with a new model of the ideology-disease outbreak interface that can be applied to both the ongoing pandemic and future disease outbreaks.

Given that much research suggests conservatives are more sensitive to disease threat, it is curious that conservatives in the U.S. seem less concerned than liberals with the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Across three studies totaling nearly 1,000 participants, we evaluated two different potential reasons why conservatives are less concerned: Experiential (conservatives are less directly affected by the outbreak than liberals) versus Political (conservatives hold COVID-specific political beliefs that make them motivated to reduce their concern). All three studies consistently showed evidence that motivated political (and not experiential) reasons more strongly underlie conservatives’ lack of concern for COVID-19. Whereas experience with (e.g., knowing people with symptoms) and impacts of (e.g., financial hardships resulting from COVID-19) the disease did not consistently mediate the conservatism-COVID concern relationship, COVID-specific Political Beliefs (e.g., opposition to government restrictions) did consistently mediate the key relationship. Pooled analyses further suggested that, while it did not strongly mediate the relationship, experience nonetheless provided a boundary condition for the conservatismperceived threat relationship: As experience/impacts with COVID-19 increased, ideology played less of a role in predicting perceived threat. Taken together, this evidence suggests that (1) conservatives’ lack of concern with the pandemic is not based in direct experience but rather motivated by desired political outcomes. However, it further suggests that (2) as experiences and impact of COVID-19 grow, the ideological effect on COVID-19 threat diminishes. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of this set of findings.

Is left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) closer to a myth or a reality? Twelve studies test the empirical existence and theoretical relevance of LWA. Study 1 reveals that both conservative and liberal Americans identify a large number of left-wing authoritarians in their lives. In Study 2, participants explicitly rate items from a recently-developed LWA measure as valid measurements of authoritarianism. Studies 3-11 show that persons who score high on this same LWA scale possess the traits associated with models of authoritarianism (while controlling for political ideology): LWA is positively related to threat sensitivity across multiple areas, including general ecological threats (Study 3), COVID disease threat (Study 4), Belief in a Dangerous World (Study 5), and Trump threat (Study 6). Further, controlling for ideology, high-LWA persons show more support for restrictive political correctness norms (Study 7), rate African-Americans and Jews more negatively (Studies 8-9), and show more domain-specific dogmatism and attitude strength (Study 10). Study 11 reveals that the majority of the effects from Studies 3-10 hold when looking only within liberals, thus revealing these effects are about liberal authoritarianism. Study 12 uses the World Values Survey to provide evidence of Left-Wing Authoritarianism around the globe. Taken in total, this large array of triangulating evidence from 12 studies comprised of over 8,000 participants from the U.S. and over 66,000 participants world-wide strongly suggests that left-wing authoritarianism is much closer to a reality than a myth.

Famous trials not only generate immense popularity and intrigue, they also have the power to change history. Surprisingly, little research examines the use of complex language during these culturally-significant trial outcomes. In the present study, we helped fill in this gap by evaluating the relationship between attorneys’ use of integratively complex language and trial outcomes. Using the well-validated Automated Integrative Complexity scoring system, we analyzed the complexity of language in the opening and closing statements of famous trials. We found that higher levels of integrative complexity led to a significant increase in winning outcomes, but only for the prosecution. Further, this effect was driven by elaborative forms of complexity and not dialectical forms of complexity. Taken together, these results fill a large gap in our understanding of how language might influence the outcomes of culturally-significant legal proceedings.